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Chapter 1
Executive 
Summary
Australians are some of the world’s greatest users of 
social media and mobile broadband, and our nation is 
in the top ten globally for internet use. At a time when 
our use of these technologies is increasingly redefining 
aspects of our personal and professional lives, Digital 
Rights in Australia explores urgent questions about the 
nature of our rights now and into the future. 
The analysis covers rights issues in four areas: privacy, 
profiling and analytics; government data matching 
and surveillance; workplace change; and freedom of 
expression and speech regulation. It explores the ethical 
and legal challenges we face in using digital, networked 
technologies and the debates we are having about how 
to best manage their transformative impacts. 
Crucially this study examines the major role of private, 
transnational digital platforms in reshaping the way we 
work, study and conduct business, our interactions with 
government and with each other. 
The program of research which generated the Digital 
Rights in Australia report has three aims: 
•	 to assess the evolving citizen uses of digital platforms, 
and associated digital rights and responsibilities in 
Australia and Asia, identifying key dynamics and issues 
of voice, participation, marginalisation and exclusion;
•	 to develop a framework for establishing the rights and 
legitimate expectations which platform stakeholders––
particularly everyday users––should enjoy and the 
responsibilities they may bear; 
•	 to identify the best models for governance 
arrangements for digital platforms and for using these 
environments as social resources in political, social and 
cultural change. 
This report draws on three sources of data: a national 
survey of the attitudes and opinions of 1600 Australians 
on key rights issues; focus group discussion of related 
rights scenarios; and analysis of legal, policy and 
governance issues, illustrated by case studies. The core 
findings are grouped in chapter order.
Privacy, Profiling, Data Analytics
•	 Australians are concerned about their online privacy. 
While two thirds of our respondents believe they 
personally have nothing to hide, only a small group 
(18%) think that more general concerns about online 
privacy are exaggerated.
•	 A majority of our respondents do not feel in control 
of their privacy online. While a majority take active 
steps to protect their privacy (67%), and have changed 
settings on the social media they use most often (61%), 
a minority (38%) felt that they can control their privacy 
online. 
•	 Women experience the online world differently from 
men: they are more likely to agree that they actively 
protect their privacy online (71%, compared with 
63% of men) and change their social media settings 
(63%, compared with 58% of men), but feel no more 
in control of their privacy (39%, compared with 
38% of men). 
•	 There may be a significant group for whom the 
answer to questions relating to privacy online are: 
“it depends” (this contrasts with answers about 
governments and privacy).
•	 Corporations were the major source of concern: 57% 
were concerned about their privacy being violated by 
corporations, although a substantial number were also 
concerned about privacy violations by government 
(47%) and other people (47%). 
•	 A large majority (78%) want to know what social media 
companies do with their personal data.
•	 In the online focus group, participants’ views were 
mixed on the use of data in targeted advertising and 
price discrimination. But there was a consensus that 
content targeting for political purposes is different: for 
2example, paying a social media platform to boost a 
negative opinion article about a rival party to users in 
marginal seats was seen as crossing a line.
Government Data Matching and 
Surveillance
•	 Nearly half of our respondents were concerned about 
government violating their privacy (47%). 
•	 A majority are opposed to government programs 
for phone companies and internet service providers 
to keep metadata on phone calls and web use. 79% 
of respondents considered retention of information 
about phone calls to be a privacy breach. A majority 
(58%) were also opposed to a policy for government-
mandated retention of information about internet 
communications.
•	 But a change in frame altered these numbers. When 
asked whether they favour law enforcement and 
security agencies being able to access metadata, 
the number in favour jumped up to 42% (47% 
opposed). Once framed as an anti-terrorism measure, 
government data-gathering about internet is 
supported by a majority of respondents (57%), while 
only 31% oppose a program described this way. 
•	 Our findings highlight the critical importance of the 
framing of questions when assessing public support 
for data collection and sharing, and interpreting 
survey results.
•	 Respondents’ attitudes towards both government 
collection of communications data, and government 
data matching programs, varied significantly 
depending on political identification. Respondents 
who identified with the Coalition were significantly 
more likely to support programs; identification with 
the Greens made a respondent more likely to oppose 
such programs. 
•	 There is considerable ambivalence among the survey 
participants towards online government data matching 
programs. We found that 42% are in favour and 45% 
are opposed to a program that tracks citizen use of 
public services and benefits. Our online focus group 
was also sharply divided on a range of data matching 
scenarios put to them.
Work
•	 Digital privacy at work matters. Most Australians do not 
think employers should look at their employees’ social 
media pages. While 37% agreed that it was acceptable 
for either prospective or current employers to look at 
public social media posts; only 20% agreed that it was 
ok for either current or prospective employers to look 
at private posts.
•	 High school educated, those not working in 
professional/skilled work, and respondents over 40, 
were most concerned about employers accessing their 
social media posts. 
•	 Only 16% of people agreed that using social 
media was an important part of their job, but most 
workplaces (72%) they were in had a policy about using 
social media while at work. Most workplaces seem to 
recognize the everyday ubiquity of social media use 
and are attempting to govern it, though only 46% of 
respondents said their workplace had a policy on what 
they post online. 
•	 In this terrain of unclear directions over social media at 
work and employers’ rights to access posts, our online 
discussion groups reinforced that privacy boundaries 
are important, but also that employees needed to use 
their own “common sense”.
•	 The encroachment of some new policy agendas, such 
as that seen in the case study of the Public Service 
Commission, needs to better reflect citizens’ desires 
for digital privacy at, and from, work. 
•	 The app driven, online gig economy presents a new 
space for digital rights analysis. Most respondents 
have heard of, but not used, a platform such as Uber, 
Airtasker or Deliveroo; and use is skewed towards 
those under 40 and the university educated.
•	 Australians see gig work as providing workers with 
more flexibility, but at the same time a majority are also 
concerned about the financial insecurity of this kind 
of work. Over 60% believe that these new forms of 
work need new government regulations. Yet, as shown 
in the case study, institutionalising fairer regulations 
is fraught.
Speech
•	 Australians are not strongly wedded to the North 
American ideal of absolute speech freedom online. 
Just over a third (37%) of those surveyed agreed 
that they should “be free to say and do what I want 
online”, but 30% disagreed and a third expressed 
reservations about the idea. People were also less 
supportive of others having that absolute freedom 
than themselves.
•	 50% of Australians agreed that everyone should have 
the right to online anonymity or pseudonymity, a figure 
that increases to 57% for those under 40 years. Around 
a third of younger Australians said it was more likely 
that they would make honest and open comment on 
the news, talk about sensitive topics like sexuality or 
question others’ opinions if they had the opportunity 
to comment anonymously.
•	 Men are more likely to assert their right to free 
expression than women, reflecting the male 
dominance of everyday speech online as much as 
offline. 
•	 Gender is a key variable in understanding attitudes 
to social media regulation. Men were less likely than 
women to agree with the need to remove within 24 
hours instances of sexual harassment, abuse targeted 
at an individual, or hate speech that encourages 
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violence against others. Women were less supportive 
than men of the right to anonymity.
•	 While most Australians had not experienced negative 
impacts from risky or harmful online speech, 39% have 
been affected by mean or abusive remarks and 27% 
have had personal content posted without consent. 
Our case study on image-based abuse emphasises 
the need for law reform and educational strategies to 
address new privacy and speech rights breaches.
•	 More than was the case for either work or privacy 
issues, Australians agreed on the need for more 
regulation of online discussion environments. They 
flagged the need for increased involvement by social 
media platforms in content moderation and ‘easy’ 
complaints reporting.
•	 There was a perception gap between people’s belief 
that harmful social media content was easy to get 
taken down, and the procedural reality that it is not 
always straightforward and may require regulatory 
intervention to persuade the host company to act, 
as the European Commission hate speech case 
study suggests. 
Policy Recommendations
1. Most Australians are concerned about their privacy 
online and are concerned about privacy violations 
by corporations. Nearly half of our respondents are 
concerned about government invading their privacy. 
Australian governments and companies need to 
address these concerns if they want to improve trust in 
the online environment, and in programs to promote 
expanded data use. 
2. Australian governments should consider taking up 
recommendations from recent Australian Law Reform 
Commission and Australian Productivity Commission 
inquiries, giving Australians more control over their 
data and more enforceable legal rights in the area of 
privacy.
3. Australians are concerned about use of data, and 
think that some use of data analytics and targeting 
by advertisers are beyond the pale – especially in the 
electoral sphere. Digital platforms must work harder to 
address these concerns effectively.
4. Australians are prepared to make some trade-offs 
between privacy and other interests. But current policy 
moves to collect and centralise more data – through 
My Health Record or a Digital ID program – look like 
pushing beyond what Australians are comfortable with.
5. Digital rights to privacy while at work are a major 
concern for Australians. Employment relations policies 
need to protect workers from prospective or current 
employers accessing their private social media data.
6. The gig economy has led to new forms of work, 
driven by online platforms. Australians expect to see 
this precarious work better regulated via targeted 
employment policies.
7. Australians agreed that there should be more 
regulation of online discussion environments. Social 
media platforms need to have greater involvement in 
content moderation and to work with government and 
citizens to ensure they are providing ‘easy’, responsive 
complaints reporting.
8. As significant numbers of Australians face new forms of 
risky and harmful speech online, government needs to 
explore law reform to address new privacy and speech 
rights breaches.
9. While Australians acknowledge that they should take 
responsibility for what they say online, they could use 
better education in media law, content regulation and 
public comment guidelines given their social media 
publishing is increasingly open to public scrutiny and 
may have legal and other consequences.

Chapter 2
What are Digital 
Rights and Why Do 
They Matter Now?
Introduction:  
The Digital Rights Challenge
The world is experiencing a fundamental transformation 
in the way people work, play and participate in political 
life. Digital platforms like Facebook, LinkedIn, WeChat 
and Twitter, Airtasker, and Uber are now just as central 
as traditional institutions to how we organize our 
professional and social lives. These platforms are also 
disrupting the ways we engage in public debate and 
mobilize political action, in advanced industrial societies, 
as well as the authoritarian states and emerging 
democracies of Australia and its Asian region.
Such digital disruption has consequences for individuals’ 
capacity to engage with their world, to connect with 
communities of interest, and to interrogate news and 
ideas. On the positive side, we now have access to 
new channels of information and interaction that are 
more difficult for governments or many corporations to 
control. Conversely, individuals—and governments—
have little say over the scope of data collection or 
individuals’ access to services, content management 
or speech standards, intellectual property or consumer 
rights on these platforms. And it is not clear how 
citizens or public bodies will have effective input into 
the development of private platforms, run by private 
entities, with often opaque decision-making processes, 
behavioural analytics and identity profiling and data 
on-selling.
What is the impact of digital disruption in our region 
on organisation of work, social, and political life? How 
are activists and ordinary people in different countries 
using digital platforms, to what effect, and with what 
challenges? How successful are governments’ attempts 
to regulate privately owned platform operation and use? 
What models exist for public-private governance?
In the face of these pressing questions about how 
we can shape and implement digital technologies, 
issues of rights and governance are now a political 
priority. So gaining a better understanding of digital 
rights in Australia—mapping the rights we think we 
have and those we might hope for—is an urgent 
matter. This report is a contribution to this important 
societal challenge.
The Digital Rights in Australia 
Report
The report is based on research undertaken by a team of 
social sciences and legal researchers from the University 
of Sydney, and is funded by the University’s Sydney 
Research Excellence Initiative (SREI). This report conveys 
phase one of an anticipated larger project on digital 
rights in Asia.
The overall aims of this project are to:
•	 assess the evolving citizen uses of digital platforms, 
and associated digital rights and responsibilities in 
Australia and Asia, identifying key dynamics and issues 
of voice, participation, marginalisation and exclusion;
•	 develop a framework for establishing rights and 
legitimate expectations which platform stakeholders––
particularly everyday users––should enjoy and 
responsibilities they may bear;
•	 identify the best models for governance arrangements 
for digital platforms and for “activating” digital 
platforms as social resources in different domains.
Broadly, our aim is to bring together an understanding 
of two things that are often seen as distinct: the new 
governance processes of digital platforms, working 
with governments and industry; and the everyday 
communication practices of individuals and civil society 
organisations.
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conducted in 2017. In this work, we bring together two 
elements:
•	 data on Australian user attitudes towards digital rights 
issues (gained from a national survey conducted on our 
behalf by Essential Media); and
•	 an analysis of key law, policy, regulation, and 
governance arrangements.
Later in this chapter, we explain our research design for 
phase one. Before we do, it is necessary to provide a 
brief introduction of how we see digital rights, indicate 
the kind of issues they respond to and raise, and why 
they are of urgent matter for everyone.
Because debates about digital rights traverse a very 
large, complex terrain, we chose to focus on four areas 
of public concern:
•	 Privacy, Profiling, and Data Analytics
•	 Government Data Matching and Surveillance
•	 Work
•	 Speech
Understanding Digital Rights
The notion of rights has a long, complex, and rich set of 
histories, based in politics, law, philosophy and ethics. As 
we celebrate the 70th anniversary of the United Nations 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UNDHR), the 
very idea of rights is still strongly contested from a wide 
range of perspectives.
We take a broad, pluralistic approach to investigating 
digital rights that encompasses elements such as:
•	 rights explicitly set out or recognized in law, policy, and 
regulation;
•	 rights ideas and practices developed and asserted 
by a wide range of movements, organizations, and 
individuals;
•	 rights that extend beyond traditional frameworks 
of states, national, regional, and international 
communities of countries.
The recognition of certain rights is shaped by cultural, 
social, political, and linguistic dynamics, as well as 
particular contexts and events (Hunt, 2007; Moyn, 2010; 
Gregg, 2012).
The ways that we acknowledge, defend or pursue rights 
— our contemporary rights “setting” —has also been 
shaped by its heritage in international relations and the 
pivotal role that rights instruments, rights “talk”, rights 
practices, and rights struggles play in our economic, 
political, and social arrangements.
In Australia, there are particular histories, arrangements, 
and challenges concerning rights (Chappell, Chesterman, 
& Hill, 2009; Gerber & Castan, 2013). Crucially, there is 
a fundamental threshold issue about the constitutional 
and legal status of rights, as registered in proposals and 
debates on a bill of rights (Byrnes, 2009; Erdos, 2010).
Markets, technology design and implementation, 
social innovation and option, outcomes for consumers, 
citizens, civil society, business, and institutions are often 
highly influenced by the kinds of rights set out in crucial 
international frameworks, and policed (or not policed) 
by institutions, such as the United Nations, World Trade 
Organization, World Intellectual Property Organization, 
as well as domestic law, courts, and regulation.
We are also keenly aware of the emergence of non-
state-based governance and regulation arrangements, 
which hinge on self- or co-regulatory codes of practice, 
or the policies of large corporate or organization 
actors to implicitly define, moderate, and manage 
particular behaviours.
Over the last three decades the emergence of digital, 
networked technologies into this rights scenario has 
generated different responses. In the early 1990s 
there was great concern that “cyberspace”, as it 
was then often termed, was a lawless frontier. A key 
question then was: how do existing rights apply to 
digital technologies?
Some two decades later such concerns have heightened 
–– as we can see with data tracking, collection and 
trading, now so pervasive and embedded in everyday 
life as to make activating privacy rights often very 
difficult. What have emerged as new areas where we 
need to think about digital rights. Consider, for instance, 
instances such as: the right to be forgotten (Brock, 
2016), the right to universal design (Boys, 2014; Bates, 
Imrie, Kullman, 2016), and our right to transparency in 
the operation of algorithms (Pasquale, 2015), artificial 
intelligence, the Internet of Things (Bunz & Meikle, 
2017), and smart cities.
The scope and nature of digital rights is in pressing need 
of clarification (Karppinen, 2017). Perhaps the most 
important reason for putting digital rights on the agenda 
at this point of technology and social transformation is to 
address a disconnection between two sets of interested 
actors and conversations.
On the one hand, there are individuals and groups 
who regard themselves as digital rights activists, 
practitioners, and researchers. Collectively, they have 
made highly significant, threshold contributions in 
drawing our attention to new locations, frameworks, 
and kinds of rights that are coalesced in relation to 
digital technologies. Key issues such advocates have 
emphasised include: Internet filtering; Internet shut-
down; the so-called “net neutrality” debate (Daly, 2016); 
the threats to freedom of expression from copyright law 
reform and enforcement. Institutional recognition of, and 
support for, such digital rights has tended to come first 
from organizations focussing on digital technologies, 
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such as Internet governance organizations like the 
Internet Society and its various regional chapters. A 
criticism of such digital rights groups is that their work is 
not so well connected to conventional or “traditional” 
human rights issues.
On the other hand, there are individuals, groups and 
many well-established institutions devoted to political 
rights, especially human rights, as these have evolved 
in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries –– especially 
articulated through international human rights treaties. 
A criticism of such rights groups is that they have been 
relatively slow to give credence and pay sufficient 
attention to the new rights frontiers that digital 
technologies represent.
We note here the many different debates about rights, 
their relevance, effectiveness, and gulf often remarked 
between lofty aspiration and the many difficulties of 
implementing and activating rights (Gaze & Hunter, 
2010; Goh, Offord, & Garbutt, 2012). In particular, 
we are mindful of the many norms and fundamental 
debates about rights, especially “human” rights, about 
what counts as “human”, and the many varieties of the 
“non-human” (across different species, environments, 
and things).
Broadly speaking, then, we want to ensure that digital 
rights is brought into the fold of human and others’ 
rights debates and struggles; and that the challenges 
and implications of digital rights are grappled with by 
the full range of rights institutions and actors.
The Terrain of Digital Rights: The 
Overarching Issues
As digital technologies have become widely embedded 
across social life, there are a set of features –– in some 
cases, still evolving –– that pose challenges, as well as 
opportunities, for rights.
Firstly, the introduction and adoption of digital 
technologies themselves changes the character of 
key aspects of information, communication, and 
media, and their associated social, cultural, and legal 
assumptions and frameworks. These changes to the 
technologies, and their uses, meanings, and business 
models, means that new issues are raised that need 
to be addressed. For instance, mobile phone cameras 
since their introduction in 2001 have been using for 
snapping and sharing intimate images. Such practices 
have generated questions about sexting, stalking, and 
image-based abuse.
Secondly, the distinctive nature of digital platforms – 
their private ownership, public utility and transnational 
operation and trading – means that new ways to 
resolve issues often need to be created. In particular, 
governance, law, policy, and regulation approaches are 
in the process of being rethought.
Thirdly, the ecology of organizations and businesses that 
offer and control large parts of digital platforms offer 
pressing challenges. This is especially the case because 
in in key areas, ranging from social media platforms and 
future Internet and mobile media platforms through 
data and algorithms, and artifical intelligence to digital 
economy and labour, the actors range from very large 
private, transnational corporations, to a diverse range of 
micro-enterprises and individuals.
Fourthly, there are mounting challenges to traditional 
human rights institutions and rights and advocacy in 
many countries, and at the international level which 
make new rights proposals more difficult to champion. 
Set alongside this is the growth of new advocacy 
organizations and models, such as those enabled by 
digital platforms, which complicates the variety of claims 
being made.
Organizations have emerged to respond to tackle digital 
rights issues. Forerunner groups include: the US-based 
Electronic Frontiers Foundation (EFF), and the Australian 
counterpart, Electronic Frontiers Foundation (EFA) 
established in 1994 (https://www.efa.org.au/); various 
activist, grassroots-based movements, including Free, 
Libre, and Open Software (FLOSS), CryptoParties, Pirate 
Parties, Creative Commons and digital commons groups; 
community informatics and community technology 
movements; and research organizations such as the now-
defunct Cyberspace Law and Policy Centre at UNSW.
Explicitly digital rights organizations include: the 
international group, Access Now (https://www.
accessnow.org/), established in 2009; and national 
groups such as Pakistan’s Digital Rights Foundation 
(https://digitalrightsfoundation.pk/); and in Australia, 
Digital Rights Watch, founded in 2016 (http://
digitalrightswatch.org.au/).
As well as these dedicated organizations, aspects of 
digital rights are also addressed by a range of advocacy 
and rights organisations, especially:
•	 those engaged with or premised upon digital 
platforms, such as the US-based Avaaz (https://avaaz.
org/), or Australian-based GetUp! (https://www.getup.
org.au/);
•	 decentralized technology innovation models such as 
Wikipedia, Wikimedia, Wikileaks;
•	 Internet policy, governance, and advocacy bodies, 
such as Internet Society, and its various chapters 
internationally;
•	 Internet and society research centres and thinktanks 
(often affiliated with the Global Network of Internet 
and Society Research Centers; http://networkofcenters.
net/), such as the longrunning Centre for Internet & 
Society, Bangalore (https://cis-india.org/), and the 
Hong Kong-based Digital Asia Hub (https://www.
digitalasiahub.org/);
8•	 digital inclusion groups, such as the Australian 
Digital Inclusion Alliance, established in 2017 (http://
digitalrightswatch.org.au/).
•	 parliamentarians;
•	 media, communications, and information policy, 
advocacy, and research groups;
•	 industry groups and individual technology companies;
Some Key Areas of Digital Rights
In our report, we focus on four areas important for 
digital rights, and then do so only by paying attention 
to selected aspects of these. There are a wide range of 
other areas of digital rights that we will briefly note –– 
to indicate significant issues as well as the complexity, 
range and scope of the digital rights terrain. In doing so, 
we would observe that, like other areas of rights, there 
are often contradictions and tensions between particular 
digital rights, or elements within a right. Further, that 
the boundary of what is and is not properly or usefully 
regarded as digital dimensions of rights is often unclear.
Internet Freedom
The advent of the Internet has progressively raised 
important forerunner issues of contemporary digital 
rights; notably via its role in enabling freedom of 
expression, sometimes termed “Internet freedom”.
A foundational concern here is effective access to 
Internet, which can incorporate a range of access 
and inclusion dimensions. Obvious threats to Internet 
freedoms include various ways to shut down or 
disable Internet access: service blocking, denial of 
service attacks, content filtering, and attempts to 
undermine “net neutrality”, or the move away from 
treating all Internet traffic “equally”, rather than giving 
preference to speed and quality to some “premium” or 
business services).
Intellectual Property (IP)
IP is a central area of digital rights, especially because 
the norms of creating information in digital forms allows 
new kinds of controls for right holders, because copying 
and sharing of digital information raises new problems 
of rights management and because new areas of 
information, media, and communication have become 
part of the digital realm, raising new issues of ownership 
and rights. Debate has ensued on the appropriate way 
for copyright treaties and laws to acknowledge and 
deal with digital information and platforms, especially 
with the strong links copyright can have for digital 
economy and culture (Lessing, 2004; Lessing, 2008). 
Good examples of particular uses and practices that 
have led to debate include: downloading and sharing 
of digital content (such as software, music, TV and 
music); copyright protections on e-books; ownership of 
information (Fairfield, 2017) and user-generated content, 
which underpins social media platforms.
Internet Governance
Internet governance emerged with mechanisms and 
cultures to develop and coordinate technical and social 
operation of the Internet. From the mid-1990s to the 
present Internet governance developed internationally, 
with the establishment of bodies such as ICANN, the 
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names & Numbers, 
the World Wide Web Consortium and the Internet 
Engineering Task Force.
From the 2010s, the North American dominance of 
internet governance has been subject to widespread 
critique, while key concepts and forms of Internet 
governance have been challenged, especially 
multistakeholderism. Major governance gatherings such 
as the World Summit on the Information Society have 
put on the agenda the need for genuinely international 
Internet governance, that acknowledges the changing 
geopolitics of this core area of digital networks.
As well as the expanding range of issues emerging in 
Internet governance what the area highlights that that 
policy analysis, governance, and regulation are essential 
to understand alongside, or as building blocks of, 
digital rights.
Digital Citizenship
In the 1990s, digital citizenship was conceived as a new 
form of political participation –– the need for people 
to develop internet literacies and understandings of 
networked social relations that would enable them to 
engage with online education and other government 
services, as well as accessing political information and 
discussion forums (Ohler, 2010; Vromen, 2017).
Over time the concept has encompassed other 
competencies, such as those expressed in the European 
Digital Framework for Citizens (European Commission, 
2016a), which mandates people develop knowledge 
and skills in information literacy, communication and 
collaboration, content creation, safety and problem 
solving in order to fully participate in society.
Debates about the scope of digital citizenship have 
encompassed different conceptions of rights and 
responsibilities and ways to behave and interact with 
others, as well as various approaches to personal privacy 
and information security, and proposals for national data 
monitoring and collection.
Digital Rights for Different Actors
Integration to issues of digital digital citizenship and 
platforms, we also need to consider the particular rights 
issues for, and perspectives of, different kinds of actors 
– especially those whose rights, or claims to rights, has 
been overlooked.
Gender and sexuality are two important, complex, 
intersectional axes of identity, belonging, and 
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communities that shape digital rights notions, practices, 
and contexts. Despite considerable effort to advance 
various aspects of women’s participation to digital 
platforms, the situation across most countries and 
settings remains profoundly unequal. Sexual minorities, 
such as LGBTQI groups, often note the benefits and new 
opportunities extend via digital platforms, but also the 
systematical barriers, harassments, and exclusion they 
still face.
Children are another group who have been a focus in 
eSafety policy, law, and education. However, children’s 
digital rights –– rather than those of their parents, carers, 
or families ––have been relatively overlooked (Taylor & 
Rooney, 2016). Emergent work on children’s rights in 
the digital age, that builds on the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (CRC), for instance, is an important 
endeavour, and useful for general understandings of 
digital rights (Livingstone & Third, 2017).
People with disabilities are another large group whose 
digital rights go well beyond the typical, and still vital, 
association with web accessibility. The 2006 Convention 
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CPRD) is a 
“post-Internet” Treaty that has many articles that rely 
upon people having full, effective, and affordable access 
to digital technologies.
Indigenous people are yet another group who have 
achieved considerable social innovation with their 
appropriation of and engagement with digital platforms, 
yet whose distinctive digital rights are often ignored. 
This is often the case too with a range of linguistic 
and cultural minorities, for whom digital platforms 
can provide important visibility, resources, and new 
communicative possibilities; yet who are often not 
included in digital rights conceptions.
Migrants, refugees, asylums seekers, and other displaced 
or migratory groups often face particular issues with 
digital rights. From very different perspectives, so do 
prisoners, where assumptions of rights often are not 
believed to apply, and whose lives are governed by 
institutions where Internet and digital technologies are 
circumscribed.
Four Key Rights Domains in  
this Report
In this report, we have chosen four priority areas for our 
survey of contemporary Australian concerns on digital 
rights: privacy; surveillance; work; and speech. There are 
many other important aspects of digital rights, but we 
selected these as they are of widespread concern.
Privacy, Profiling, and Data Analytics
Privacy is a longstanding and much debated social and 
legal issue. Traditional liberal notions of public and 
spheres are collapsing, as challenges emerge associated 
with digital platforms.
The nature of privacy itself continues to be discussed, 
not least because notions of privacy can be specific to 
a range of factors: cultural context; age, class, gender, 
sexuality, race, disability, and other categories (Taylor & 
Rooney, 2016); income and occupation. Regardless of 
one’s view of privacy, it is clear that there are mounting 
issues in societies where: much existing kinds of 
information are now held in digital form; and new kinds 
of information, premised on digital platforms, are being 
created, held, and brought to bear across many aspects 
of everyday, private, and public life (Friedewald et al., 
2017). Such issues are highlighted by incidents such 
as: the inadvertent release or hacking of personal and 
credit card information, held by businesses; the use of 
information gained via social media profiles and activity 
for purposes not intended by the person; and concerns 
about safety, security, and potential harassment, due to 
gathering of geolocation data from apps, smartphones, 
or WiFi. At an overarching level, the question arises more 
broadly of whether a unique concept of “digital privacy” 
needs to be developed.
Government Data Matching and Surveillance
The extent of information and data gathered through 
digital platforms, the development of technologies to 
make sense of it (especially computational technologies), 
and the wide range of uses organizations and 
government can potentially make of such data, makes 
surveillance a central issue (Cole, Fabbrini, & Schulhofer, 
2017; Daly, 2017). Because of the wide range of data 
held by private organizations, especially commercial 
organizations, there are a greatly expanded set of ways 
in which individuals and groups can be surveilled. In 
addition, there are concerns that surveillance practices 
are regarded as acceptable, because of the potential 
benefits that may be advanced.
Surveillance of citizens, and other populations, by 
governments has been a longstanding concern, which 
has been embodied in various rights and protections. 
Consider, for instance, the “Five Eyes” arrangement, 
by which the US, UK, Australia, New Zealand, and 
Canada have collected and shared intelligence since 
the World War II period. This kind of gathering of 
data for intelligence purposes has been dramatically 
extended by new data infrastructures and collection 
practices (Ruby, Goggin, & Keane, 2017). In particular, 
telecommunications and Internet data held by private 
companies is routinely shared with government 
agencies –– widespread practices that came to light 
with the relevations of whistle-blower Edward Snowden 
concerning the US National Security Agency (NSA). 
Governments around the world, including the Australian 
government, have passed legislation on data retention, 
interception, access, and investigation, requiring digital 
technology companies to make user data available. 
The rationale for such legislation is often cited as the 
presence of extended national security threats especially, 
after 9/11, terrorism.
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The availability and cross-matching possibilities of a 
wide range of other data is something currently being 
developed by governments. In Australia, analysis of 
data has been advanced as ushering in a powerful new 
tool of welfare policy, to pinpoint and tackle areas of 
poverty and welfare “dependence”. The stakes in such 
governmental uses of data were highlighted in the 
so-called “Robo debt” affair of 2016-2017, in which 
Centrelink, in its Better Management of the Social 
Welfare System Initiative, relied upon data matching 
to identify overpayment, and then on databases and 
automation to notify recipients and require repayment 
(Senate, 2017). Other important areas of surveillance 
include e-Health (Adams, Purtova, & Leenes, 2017), face 
recognition technology, and biometrics. In China, new 
plans for using citizens’ data raise the prospect of whole 
of population and life-course surveillance.
Given the vast growth in surveillance, accountability, 
social and legal frameworks, conceptualisations of rights, 
identification of breaches (such as discriminatory data 
practices), and effective and practices for accessing 
rights have lagged (Norris et al. 2017).
Work
Rights at work is a longstanding area of concern for new 
technology. In relation to digital technologies, there are 
a range of potential rights’ concern –– many with clear 
precursors, and some which are much more distinctive.
The “digitalisation” of work affects most workers, 
however to varying degrees, and often in different 
ways. The processses of digitalisation have been 
underway since the major changes in information and 
communication technologies in the second half of 
the twentieth century, including: the heightened role 
of information in workplaces; the emergence of new 
kinds of work and professions; telecommunications and 
computerization, and their role in work transformations 
(Flecker, 2016; Fuchs, 2014).
In the past decade or so, the reliance upon workers and 
their organizations upon computers, Internet, mobile 
communication, and social media, has brought issues 
of digitlisation further to the fore, raising fundamental 
issues about the nature of work, and the relationship 
between work and home and other “non”-work setting 
(Gregg, 2011). Digitalisation of work has also been 
underway in the arenas of domestic work and labour, as 
well as other kinds of “unpaid”, less official, or valorized 
work, such as caring and voluntary work (Wilson & 
Yochim, 2017).
Digital platforms have been interwoven into the 
creation of new forms of work and labour, moving 
beyond “telecommuting”, “mobile office”, “call centre” 
setting and practices into work such as: creating digital 
platforms or content; work in digital economy, such as 
creating value for sale to gamers; work supported by 
digital intermediary platforms (such as Airbnb; Uber; 
Delivero; Airtasker); and crowdwork platforms (such as 
Mechanical Turk) (Gahan, Healy, & Nicholson, 2017).
New developments in digital technologies, especially 
robotics, AI, and associated technologies, are raising 
concerns about the future of work.
Because of the prevalence and extension of digital 
platforms into many areas of work, there are new kinds of 
issues that are not necessarily clearly captured by labour 
rights. For instance, the issues of freedom of expression 
on social media platforms.
Digital technologies have often been associated with 
discourses that emphasise the new possibilities of 
generating flexible work, value, and other benefits 
from new arrangements. It has often proven difficult to 
ascertain, identify, and address the challenges to work-
related rights issues.
Speech
Speech, expression and associated communicative rights 
have tended to feature in the “top table” of human 
rights conversations (Gelber, 2011). Digital technologies 
have been praised and counted upon for opening up 
new avenues by which people can exercise their freedom 
of expression, mobilise political change, problem-
solve across cultural boundaries and develop creative 
economies. Our understanding of speech freedoms then 
is tightly bound with other conceptions of political, social 
and cultural agency, and with economic development.
The new avenues and dimensions of such digitally-
enabled freedoms of expression can be threatened 
or curtailed, as we see above in relation to Internet 
freedoms.  Key issues for societies to navigate 
include how to conceptualize and safeguard speech, 
expression, and communication rights, how to chart 
the new ethical dimensions of online communicative 
relations and how to encourage talk that encourages 
participation by all, rather than just the most vocal 
or privileged, and in forms of address and tone that 
includes, rather than excludes. These freedoms also 
pose new challenges for how expressive domains such 
as social media platforms might be regulated –– not 
least with the rise of non-state actors, especially in the 
form of transnational corporations owning and providing 
media environments (Laidlaw, 2015; Verhulst, Price, & 
Morgan, 2013).
An important issue relates to the longstanding issues of 
balancing responsibilities and rights, especially given 
the interconnectedness in digital platforms, between 
effective expression, listening, and civility. Here the 
much-vaunted expansion in channels and means for 
people to express themselves via Internet, which raised 
such hope in the 1990s (and still does inspire action), 
can be vitiated for many with the realities of social and 
mobile media communication. Here new, circumscribed 
and visual modes of speaking present challenges for 
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interpretation across cultural boundaries. The possibility 
for anonymous and pseudonymous talk can be exploited 
in aggressive, even violent and exploitative ways. Even 
the evolution of real-name identification systems for 
social media systems has not stemmed the tide of 
aggressive and harmful speech that can deter people 
from participation in public discussion.
Much of the discourse around digital rights then has 
been occupied with strategies to help speakers protect 
themselves from online harassment (especially race, 
gender, sex, disability, and other-inflected harassment), 
trolling, misinformation and extortion, swatting, doxxing, 
and image-based abuse. In recent years however the 
focus has shifted to examine the broader rights setting 
– including the right of social media users to be free 
from harmful speech, and the consequent regulatory 
responsibilities of the host or publishing platforms, 
as well as governments supported by civil society 
organisations involved in content regulation, speech 
rights and civil liberties issues. Equally important are 
young people’s rights to better education in media law, 
content regulation and public commenting policies as 
these apply to their social media use in study and work.
Research Approach and Design
As noted, this report presents phase one of a larger 
study of digital rights in Australia and Asia. Phase 
one has three methodological components: a survey; 
discussion group; and legal-policy analysis.
i. Survey: We commissioned Essential Media to conduct 
a representative survey of 1600 Australian respondents 
(see Appendix for the full questionnaire). The 1600 
participants were randomly selected to undertake 
an online survey from Essential Media’s Your Source 
online panel of over 100,000 members. The survey was 
conducted in July 2017. Essential Research provided 
incentives to its online panel members in the form of 
points. In addition, Essential Research provided a $100 
incentive to the participants in the online focus group 
discussion.
Key themes of survey included:
•	 Information & Privacy: privacy violations; control; 
platform regulations
•	 Work: social media at work; future of work; gig 
economy
•	 Speech online: free speech; anonymity; online abuse; 
and platform responsibilities.
•	 Demographics: social media use; social background; 
partisanship.
All respondents completed the Information and Privacy 
sections of the questionnaire. 800 respondents complete 
the Work section, and 800 completed the Speech 
section of the questionnaire.
Throughout the report we present analysis of the digital 
rights attitudinal and behavioural data as cross tabulation 
with key demographic variables such as: gender, age, 
education attainment, location, frequency of social 
media posting, occupation type, and party identification. 
When there is a significant statistical difference between 
groups an * is used.
ii. Discussion Groups: Following the survey, participants 
were asked if they were willing to be contacted again 
to take part in an online discussion forum. Based on the 
criteria of being over 35-year-old males and females 
Australia wide, and medium to frequent users of social 
media, the 14 participants were randomly selected for 
the online discussion forum.
Scenarios used include:
•	 Personal data use by internet companies (e.g. targeted 
advertising)
•	 Employer and employee social media use
•	 Government use of personal data (e.g. tax, health, law 
enforcement)
•	 Freedom of speech, abuse, complaints and regulatory 
processes.
We received ethical approval for the research from the 
University of Sydney’s Human Rights Ethics Committee 
(project no. 2017/461).
iii. Legal and Policy Analysis of Digital Rights and 
Governance Debates and Current Cases:
Following the survey and discussion group research, we 
chose relevant aspects of Australian and international 
digital right law, policy, cases, and debates for detailed 
research and analysis.

Chapter 3
Privacy, 
Profiling, 
Data Analytics
Core findings
•	 Australians are concerned about their online privacy. 
While two-thirds of our respondents believe they 
personally have nothing to hide, only a small group 
(18%) thinks that more general concerns about online 
privacy are exaggerated.
•	 A majority of our respondents do not feel in control 
of their privacy online. While a majority take active 
steps to protect their privacy (67%), and have changed 
settings on the social media they use most often (61%), 
a minority (38%) feel they can control their privacy 
online.
•	 Women experience the online world differently from 
men: they are more likely to agree that they actively 
protect their privacy online (71%, compared with 63% 
of men) and change their social media settings (63%, 
compared with 58% of men), but feel no more in 
control of their privacy (39%, compared with 38% of 
men).
•	 There may be a significant group for whom the answer 
to questions relating to privacy online is ‘It depends’ 
(this contrasts with answers about governments and 
privacy).
•	 Corporations are the major source of concern: 57% 
of respondents were concerned about their privacy 
being violated by corporations, although a substantial 
number were also concerned about privacy violations 
by government (47%) and other people (47%).
•	 A large majority (78%) want to know what social media 
companies do with their personal data.
•	 In the online focus group, participants’ views were 
mixed on the use of data in targeted advertising and 
price discrimination; however, there was a consensus 
that content targeting for political purposes is different 
– for example, paying a social media platform to boost 
a negative opinion article about a rival party to users in 
marginal seats was seen to be crossing a line.
3.1 Issues in privacy and data 
processing in policy and practice
Digital platforms collect and use a wide range of 
information about their users. They collect highly 
granular data provided by users that directly reveals 
users’ interests, beliefs, political orientation, personal 
family and social networks, location and regularly 
visited locations, and spending habits. Some platforms 
– especially comprehensive social media sites like 
Facebook – collect indirect information from users’ 
interactions with pictures and news stories that may 
reveal these types of information or, by inference, more 
intimate information that users would prefer to keep 
private. Platforms may also collect and link information 
gleaned from other members of an individual’s network, 
such as contact details held by a friend or photos 
uploaded and tagged by a family member (Marwick & 
boyd, 2014).
Increases in processing speed and power, and more 
advanced data analytics techniques and tools, expand 
the ability of online platforms to use these data to draw 
inferences and determine in real time what users of 
platforms will see. On the major social media platforms, 
for example, people will see a highly targeted and 
individualised newsfeed, generated through analysis 
of all the personal information that has been collected, 
as well as information about other users and their 
responses. The feed is designed to hold attention for as 
long as possible and increase users’ interactions with the 
content (DeVito, 2017). Advanced techniques are being 
developed with the goal of increasing the likelihood that 
people will see advertisements that will motivate them 
to act – even predict what they might want before they 
are aware of it themselves. Large datasets collected 
over time can also affect other real-world outcomes – 
for example, to determine who will be offered certain 
prices or insurance rates, credit or job opportunities. 
Increasingly in public there is concern that such analysis 
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has been used to affect political discourse and even 
voting patterns (Tufecki, 2015).
There is a growing awareness of these issues in the 
mainstream media. But apparently increasing awareness 
of the potential risks and downsides of large-scale data 
collection and analytics is not leading to a decline in the 
use of digital platforms. People are making trade-offs 
between privacy and other interests, and developing 
strategies for managing how information about them 
is disclosed and to whom, despite limitations in both 
the law and technology (Marwick & boyd, 2014). How 
do people make the trade-offs involved in using digital 
platforms? Where do people draw the line between 
acceptable collection, publication and use of information 
– and what is creepy or beyond the pale? Another 
important question is where people perceive that the 
greatest threats to their privacy comes from: the private 
sector, government or perhaps their own peers and 
networks?
In this report, we discuss these interrelated issues 
of information collection, disclosure and use under 
the general rubric of privacy. We acknowledge that 
privacy is a multifaceted and contested concept, long 
acknowledged to be very difficult to define (Wacks, 
1980). It is contextual (Nissenbaum, 2010): it means 
different things to different people and in different 
contexts, and can be understood differently across 
cultures (Altman, 1977). The very way it is understood 
is changing as we become more enmeshed in digital 
networks, where our boundaries are no longer entirely 
ours to individually control (Cohen, 2012; Marwick & 
boyd, 2014). Privacy is concerned not just with the right 
to be left alone, or to be protected from intrusion; it is 
also concerned with controlling our interactions with 
others (Altman, 1977; ALRC, 2014). In thinking about the 
rights and responsibilities that users might have in their 
information relationship with online platforms, privacy is 
a core organising concept.
Privacy can also be conceived as a right, recognised 
as fundamental at an international level and at least 
recognised in Australia as a fundamental interest that 
law should protect (ALRC, 2014). The failure of Australian 
law to protect privacy has been widely acknowledged 
– as has government inaction in the face of repeated 
recommendations to undertake law reform (Daly, 
2017). It is important to try to understand what people 
think and feel about these developments, even as we 
recognise that their feelings may be heavily determined 
by context, and may change radically over time. 
Understanding how people view privacy and the limits of 
what is acceptable can inform extra-legal developments 
(such as industry ethical frameworks) and perhaps help us 
move towards change.
We asked questions across this spectrum. In this chapter, 
we talk first about general attitudes to privacy, and the 
private sector context. The related but distinct questions 
raised by government information processing and 
surveillance are addressed in Chapter 4. Questions about 
what expectations employers and employees might have 
regarding social media use and monitoring are dealt with 
in our discussion of work in Chapter 5.
3.2 General attitudes towards and 
understandings of privacy
3.2.1 Are people concerned about privacy?
Australians are concerned about their online privacy. To 
provide an initial gauge of Australians’ feelings about 
privacy in the digital world, we asked them for their 
attitudes on two general stereotypes: ‘I have nothing to 
hide’ and ‘Privacy concerns are exaggerated’. While two-
thirds of our respondents believed that they personally 
had nothing to hide, only a small group (18%) thought 
that more general debates and public concerns about 
online privacy were unwarranted. Frequent social media 
posters (29%) and respondents aged under 40 (25%) 
were most likely to agree that online privacy concerns 
were exaggerated. While men (21%), capital city 
dwellers (21%) and the university educated (21%) were 
also more likely to agree, the differences were not as 
substantial. Notably, older people aged over 60 (77%) 
and those with a high school level of education (74%) 
were most likely to agree that they had ‘nothing to hide’. 
Those under 40 were the least likely to agree with this 
proposition (56%).
Table 3.1: ‘Concerns about privacy online are 
exaggerated’ (n=1603)
Agree Neither Disagree
Age*
Under 40 25 32 43
40–59 15 31 54
60+ 13 22 65
Gender*
Male 21 31 48
Female 16 27 57
Location*
Capital city 21 29 51
Not capital city 15 29 56
Education*
High school 16 30 53
Technical 16 35 49
University 21 25 54
Posting*
At least once a day 29 29 41
At least once a week 23 31 46
At least once a month 15 27 58
Less often or never 13 30 57
TOTAL (%) 18 29 53
TOTAL (n) 294 463 846
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Table 3.2: ‘I have nothing to hide’ (n=1603)
Agree Neither Disagree
Age*
Under 40 56 29 14
40–59 66 24 10
60+ 77 17 6
Gender
Male 64 24 12
Female 66 24 9
Location*
Capital city 62 26 11
Not capital city 70 21 9
Education*
High school 74 20 6
Technical 65 27 8
University 60 25 14
Posting
At least once a day 70 19 11
At least once a week 61 29 11
At least once a month 69 20 11
Less often or never 65 25 10
TOTAL (%) 65 24 10
TOTAL (n) 1048 388 167
3.2.2 What do people do about privacy online 
(and does it help)?
We also asked respondents whether they took steps 
to protect their privacy online and whether they felt 
in control. This is important because where rights to 
privacy are protected, for the most part the law treats 
privacy as an individual right (Cohen, 2012). On social 
media platforms, privacy is given technical effect through 
access control lists, in which users can determine who 
can get access to certain information. We included an 
example of whether they had changed these privacy 
settings on their most used social media platform (which 
for the vast majority was Facebook), and whether they 
feel like they have control over their privacy in the 
everyday digital context.
Tables 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5 suggest that, on the whole, 
people do not feel in control of their privacy online, and 
that taking active steps to protect privacy online does 
not lead to a feeling of control. 
The group most likely to agree that they actively protect 
their privacy online were the everyday social media 
posters (75% agreed). These people were also most 
likely to change their privacy settings (69%) and most 
likely to feel in control of their privacy (55%). Similarly, 
people under 40 also changed their settings (67%) and 
were more likely than the average user to feel that they 
could control their privacy online (46%). This suggests 
that frequent public posting is related to feelings of 
confidence about using platforms regularly, but also to 
feeling in control of any potential incursions into privacy.
Table 3.3: I actively protect my privacy online 
(n=1603)
Agree Neither Disagree
Age
Under 40 67 28 5
40–59 69 26 6
60+ 66 29 5
Gender*
Male 63 30 7
Female 71 25 4
Education*
High school 65 29 5
Technical 62 31 6
University 71 24 5
Posting*
At least once a day 75 21 4
At least once a week 66 29 6
At least once a month 63 29 9
Less often or never 65 29 6
TOTAL (%) 67 28 5
TOTAL (n) 1077 441 85
Women (71%) were very likely to agree that they actively 
protected their privacy online and changed their social 
media settings (63%), but they felt no more in control 
of their privacy than men (38%). Taken together with 
their greater tendency to disagree that concerns about 
privacy are exaggerated (Table 3.1), this suggests that 
women generally experience the online world differently.
Table 3.4: Thinking specifically about the social 
media platform you use most often, have you 
changed the privacy settings from the original 
default setting to restrict who can access your 
profile? (n=1263)
Yes
Age*
Under 40 67
40–59 59
60+ 51
Gender*
Male 57
Female 63
Education
High school 58
Technical 57
University 64
Yes
Posting*
At least once a day 69
At least once a 
week 62
At least once a 
month 65
Less often or never 52
TOTAL (%) 61
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These findings are particularly striking in light of the fact 
that both the current Australian legal framework, and 
the terms and conditions applied by online platforms, 
are based on a model of notice and consent: notification 
that personal information is being collected and consent 
to those uses. Recent discussions at the policy level, such 
as Productivity Commission’s Data Availability and Use 
report relating to government data sharing, also centre 
around the idea of giving people more control over their 
data (Productivity Commission, 2017).
On the other hand, the feeling of a lack of control is not 
surprising. The privacy features and settings of social 
media platforms vary widely, from a simple public/private 
option on Twitter and Instagram to a web of privacy and 
disclosure settings on Facebook. But, broadly speaking, 
privacy settings common on social media platforms give 
users some measure of control over who in their social 
networks can see what, and what material is exposed 
to the open internet. Yet these systems are incomplete. 
While I may limit who can access my posts online, friends 
with more public accounts end up exposing information 
about me to a much broader audience. In this networked 
environment, we are not entirely in control. Further, 
online platform settings do not allow users to control 
what the platform itself or its advertisers can do with the 
information that is collected. As we discuss in the next 
section, while people are concerned about the actions of 
fellow users online, they are more concerned about the 
privacy threat from corporations.
Table 3.5: I feel I can control my privacy online 
(n=1603)
Agree Neither Disagree
Age*
Under 40 46 36 18
40-59 35 39 27
60+ 32 37 31
Gender
Male 38 37 25
Female 39 37 25
Education*
High school 42 37 21
Technical 32 39 28
University 39 36 25
Posting*
At least once 
a day
55 32 13
At least once a 
week
45 36 19
At least once a 
month
35 36 29
Less often or 
never
31 42 27
TOTAL (%) 38 37 25
TOTAL (n) 612 595 396
3.2.3 Where does the privacy threat 
come from?
We asked where our respondents believed the 
threat to their privacy came from. The answer was 
primarily ‘corporations’. A majority agree that they 
were concerned about their privacy being violated by 
corporations (57%), while a substantial number were 
also concerned about violations by government (47%) 
and other people (47%). There were very few differences 
of substance among sub-sets of our respondents in 
their concern about corporations violating their online 
privacy, with just the university educated (61%), daily 
social media posters (61%) and those living in capital 
cities (60%) slightly more concerned than the average. In 
terms of other people violating privacy, there were again 
few substantial differences in the perceptions among 
sub-groups among our respondents. The main exception 
was that, again, daily social media posters were mostly 
likely to be concerned about privacy violations by other 
people (60%). More detailed information about attitudes 
towards government is included in Chapter 4.
Table 3.7: I am concerned corporations are 
violating my privacy online (n=1603)
Agree Neither Disagree
Age
Under 40 58 32 11
40-59 58 33 9
60+ 54 35 11
Gender
Male 59 31 11
Female 55 35 10
Location*
Capital city 60 31 9
Not capital city 52 36 12
Education*
High school 55 35 10
Technical 51 36 13
University 61 30 9
Posting
At least once a day 61 28 11
At least once a week 55 35 10
At least once a month 60 32 8
Less often or never 59 32 10
TOTAL (%) 57 33 10
TOTAL (n) 910 527 166
On social media, it is possible – and common – for 
people to upload or tag photos of other people, making 
information public even where a person has strict privacy 
settings for their own profile. We focused on this specific 
example of when privacy might be breached by other 
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people to see how our respondents understood this. 
A relatively innocuous and frequently occurring activity 
of sharing a non-intimate photograph online without 
permission was considered a breach of privacy by the 
vast majority of our respondents (82%), although those 
under 40 (77%) were slightly less likely to be concerned 
by this.
3.3 Comparing European Union 
and Australian responses to data 
collection and analytics
In a world of rapidly transforming technology and 
commercial practice around the collection and use of 
ever-larger data sets and increasingly advanced data 
analytics, we might expect to see some response in the 
legal and regulatory sphere.
The European Union (EU) response has been proactive. 
European law has long recognised the fundamental 
right to privacy and to data protection.1 The EU’s new 
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) (European 
Union, 2016) takes effect in May 2018.2 The GDPR ‘seeks 
to harmonise the protection of fundamental rights and 
freedoms of natural persons in respect of processing 
activities and to ensure the free flow of personal data 
between [European Union] Member States’ (Recital 3). 
The GDPR includes new rights: the right to be forgotten 
(Article 17) and the right to data portability (Article 20). 
It also addresses data profiling, distinguishing between 
common profiling (analysing or predicting aspects of a 
natural person’s life) and high-risk profiling (where the 
profiling produces legal effects concerning a person or 
significantly affects a person). More stringent rules apply 
to the latter, and could impact activities such as using 
data analytics for price discrimination (Steppe, 2017). 
The European Parliament has also been proactive in 
responding to increasing automation, with a Resolution 
from February 2017 on Civil Law Rules on Robotics (Daly, 
2017). In June 2017, the UK House of Lords established 
a Select Committee on Artificial Intelligence to consider 
the economic, ethical and social implications of advances 
in artificial intelligence, and to make recommendations.
By contrast, Australia’s law-makers have been slow to 
respond (Daly, 2017). Australian privacy law is the result 
of both legislation and the common law. There is no right 
to privacy enshrined in the Constitution and, unlike many 
other liberal democracies, Australia lacks a constitutional 
or statutory Bill of Rights at the Commonwealth level. 
Information collection and processing by government 
and by larger private sector players is governed by the 
Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) and a range of state and territory 
legislation. This does not provide an enforceable right 
to privacy. The Privacy Act includes thirteen ‘Australian 
Privacy Principles’ that broadly impose obligations 
on organisations when collecting, handling, storing, 
using and disclosing personal information, and certain 
rights for individuals to access and correct personal 
information. The Privacy Principles place more stringent 
obligations on entities that handle ‘sensitive information’ 
about an individual, including information about their 
health and biometric data, racial or ethnic origin, political 
opinions and membership, religious beliefs or affiliation, 
sexual orientation and criminal record. Australians, 
however, have no direct right to sue for a breach – only 
rights to complain, first to the organisation involved or, 
if there is no satisfactory response, to the Office of the 
Australian Information Commissioner.
Australians’ rights against unwanted intrusions on 
seclusion, or the unwanted revelation of private 
information, are also limited. The appellate courts in 
Australia do not currently recognise any civil cause 
of action for invasion of privacy, although the High 
Court has left open the possibility of developing one 
(Daly, 2017). There is some potential to seek remedies 
for serious invasions of privacy through other legal 
mechanisms, such as legal rights to prevent physical 
invasion or surveillance of one’s home, rights against 
defamation or the disclosure of confidential information, 
or even copyright law (ALRC 2014). Proposals to 
recognise a statutory cause of action from the Australian 
Law Reform Commission have not been acted on 
(Daly, 2017).
None of these various Australian legal regimes have 
responded to broader shifts in the capacity to gather 
data on a larger scale, to link datasets, to analyse data 
and to use such capacities to draw inferences about 
people or tailor what people see or the decisions that 
are made about them at an ever more fine-grained level.
For now, Australians’ hope of some data protection 
may be indirect. The GDPR has some global effect – 
compliance obligations for international organisations or 
businesses based outside the European Union that have 
an establishment in the EU, that offer goods and services 
in the EU, or that monitors or processes the behaviour of 
individuals in the EU.
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Table 3.8: I am concerned other people are 
violating my privacy online (n=1603)
Agree Neither Disagree
Age
Under 40 49 33 17
40-59 48 38 15
60+ 43 37 20
Gender
Male 47 36 18
Female 48 36 16
Education
High school 48 34 18
Technical 44 36 20
University 49 37 15
Posting*
At least once a day 60 24 16
At least once a week 44 40 16
At least once a month 47 31 23
Less often or never 46 38 15
TOTAL (%) 47 36 17
TOTAL (n) 756 573 274
Table 3.9: It is a breach of privacy if someone 
in my social network publishes online a photo 
of me without my permission
Breach Not breach
Age*
Under 40 77 23
40-59 84 16
60+ 87 13
Gender*
Male 79 21
Female 85 15
Education
High school 84 16
Technical 81 19
University 81 19
Posting*
At least once a day 83 17
At least once a week 71 29
At least once a month 82 18
Less often or never 86 14
TOTAL (%) 82 18
TOTAL (n) 1248 271
3.4 Data analytics, targeting and 
discrimination
How information is used is to shape our online 
interactions is a question of growing public discussion. 
Data analytics, the use of machine learning and other 
related technologies can affect – and harm – individuals 
or broader societal interests even where no personal 
information is ever disclosed. These developments 
give rise to broader concerns around maintenance of 
consumer trust, fairness of opportunities and outcomes, 
and avoiding biases in decision-making and skewing of 
communications that can result from the application of 
data analytics (Leonard, 2017).
In commerce, highly targeted advertising, price 
discrimination and issues around automated processing 
of job applications have all attracted attention, giving 
rise to suggestions that new legal and ethical frameworks 
are needed (Yeung, 2017).
We asked respondents whether they wanted to know 
more about what social media platforms and other 
online companies do with the data generated by and 
about them. In particular, we asked how important it was 
to them to access reports on the internet user profiles 
constructed about them. Large majorities of respondents 
believed it was either very important or important to be 
able to access reports of:
•	 what third-party companies do with your personal 
information – 78%
•	 the list of third-party companies that can access your 
profile – 75%
•	 records of what you have done on social media – 55%
•	 records of what you have bought online – 54%.
People were not concerned so much about what 
information is collected or held; rather, they were far 
more interested in what corporate platforms, and 
others like advertisers, do with the information. This 
is reinforced in Table 3.10, which shows that a large 
majority of respondents (78%) wanted to know what 
social media companies did with their personal data. 
Again, everyday social media posters (86%) were the 
most likely to agree. Interestingly, those aged under 
40 (72%) were significantly less likely to agree that they 
wanted to know about this form of data use.
Attitudes towards use of data analytics, targeting and 
personalisation are hard to address through a survey, 
because people’s attitudes to these issues are nuanced 
and context-dependent. Our online focus group was 
used to explore these questions further. In this way, the 
study was able to test how participants responded to 
different scenarios in which their data was collected, 
analysed and subsequently used by private companies. 
The questions started at a very general level (‘How do 
you broadly feel about internet companies using the 
data you share with them (such as emails, social media 
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activity) for marketing purposes, and why’) and became 
more specific.
Table 3.10: I want to know what social media 
companies do with the information they 
collect, share, keep and use about me
Agree Neither Disagree
Age*
Under 40 72 23 5
40-59 81 15 4
60+ 82 14 4
Gender*
Male 73 22 5
Female 82 14 4
Location*
Capital city 79 17 3
Not capital city 75 19 6
Education*
High school 77 18 6
Technical 74 21 5
University 81 16 3
Posting*
At least once a day 86 12 2
At least once a week 76 20 4
At least once a month 77 17 6
Less often or never 80 17 4
TOTAL (%) 78 18 4
TOTAL (n) 1248 286 69
The first scenario related to companies using collected 
data to target advertising to them. Responses to this 
question fell broadly into two camps. Some people said 
that it ‘feels like someone is watching’, describing the 
feeling as ‘creepy’ and a ‘violation of privacy’:
I hate the idea of targeting ads … the simple fact is Gmail 
is effectively selling out my private details [which] may seem 
harmless, but where does it end?
Other members of the focus group thought that targeted 
advertising was harmless – perhaps even convenient: 
‘I don’t mind, as it’s clearly something or a particular 
service I will go search for in my own time.’ Given the 
scenario of Gmail targeting ads for holiday packages 
at you because you wrote ‘I need a holiday’ in a recent 
email, one panellist commented that ‘I don’t have to surf 
the web, it’s almost like it’s being done for me’. Another 
described targeted advertising as ‘just an evolution of 
advertising’. Another was explicit about the trade-off:
I also find it a bit invasive but the upside is being able to grab a 
good deal.
Reinforcing the importance of context, as well as the 
importance of personal responsibility, one participant 
highlighted that there might be different expectations of 
privacy between online platforms:
If you are going to post ‘I need a holiday’ on a giant billion 
dollar social aggregate like Facebook, I would be very surprised 
if I didn’t start getting targeted ads. So far as looking for 
information in something like my emails? That is a breach of 
privacy and would lead to discontinuing my affiliation with the 
service.
Another documented use of data analytics in commerce 
is to offer different prices to different consumers (White 
House Executive Office, 2015). Faced with a scenario 
of differential pricing offering by companies on internet 
platforms, the views of our panellists were mixed.
In the case of different prices being advertised based 
on a user’s gender for a service (such as car mechanical 
servicing), most people felt uncomfortable, citing 
notions of gender inequity and the fact that this practice 
fed into such discriminatory practices. However, in a 
different scenario – such as a particular designer clothing 
company choosing not to show ads to consumers who 
lived in lower socioeconomic areas – responses were 
more divided, with some believing everyone should see 
the same thing on the internet, regardless of where they 
lived, while many didn’t see this practice as problematic, 
believing it was simply ‘smart advertising’ or ‘just 
marketing’.
More recently, the lack of transparency around highly 
targeted political advertising on platforms like Facebook 
has attracted sufficient international attention to prod 
some response from social media companies, with 
Facebook, Twitter and Google all announcing new 
transparency measures around political advertising in 
October 2017 (e.g. Facebook, 2017). Note that our 
online panel discussion was conducted in August 2017, 
before the recent flurry of news coverage and activity.
There was a clear consensus among participants when 
it came to the matter of targeted political advertising 
on social media platforms. Most agreed that content 
targeting for political purposes should be treated 
differently from targeting for marketing. For example, 
if a political party were to pay Facebook to boost a 
negative opinion article about a rival party to Facebook 
users who live in marginal seats, this scenario was seen 
as crossing a line in terms of social media use, even by 
those who expressed little interest in politics or little trust 
in politicians:
[P]ersonally I really don’t care about politics but I just think it’s 
wrong to use social media for that purpose.
Social media shouldn’t be able to bias one party due to being 
paid by the other, it’s downright wrong and a complete sham.
Some participants were less concerned about this type 
of data analytics in social media use, or were prepared to 
simply ignore it even if they encountered such targeted 
political advertising themselves. There is nothing new, 
after all, about ‘biased’ political advertising.
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Endnotes
1  Data protection is enshrined in the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (Article 16), 
which provides that: ‘Everyone has the right to the 
protection of personal data concerning him or her. 
Such data must be processed fairly for specified 
purposes and on the basis of the consent of the 
person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid 
down by law. Everyone has the right of access to data 
which has been collected concerning him or her, and 
the right to have it rectified.’ According to the Treaty, 
everybody has the right to the protection of personal 
data concerning them. The fundamental right to the 
protection of personal data is explicitly recognised 
also in Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union. The right to privacy (more 
generally) is recognised in Article 8.
2  Note that in the EU, a regulation is more powerful 
than a Directive. As a regulation, the GDPR is not 
to be transposed into national law but forms an 
automatic part of it.
Chapter 4
Government 
data matching 
and surveillance
Core findings
•	 Nearly half of our respondents were concerned about 
government violating their privacy (47%). 
•	 A majority were opposed to government programs 
for phone companies and internet service providers 
to keep metadata on phone calls and web use. 
Some 79% of respondents considered retention of 
information about phone calls to be a privacy breach. 
A majority (58%) were also opposed to a policy for 
government-mandated retention of information about 
internet communications.
•	 But a change in frame altered these numbers. When 
asked whether they favoured law enforcement and 
security agencies being able to access metadata, the 
number in favour jumped to 42% (47% opposed). 
However, when framed as an anti-terrorism measure, 
government data-gathering about the internet was 
supported by a majority of respondents (57%), while 
only 31% opposed a program described in this way. 
•	 Our findings highlight the critical importance of the 
framing of questions when assessing public support 
for data collection and sharing, and interpreting survey 
results.
•	 Respondents’ attitudes towards both government 
collection of communications data, and government 
data matching programs, varied significantly 
depending on political identification. Respondents 
who identified with the Coalition were significantly 
more likely to support programs; identification with the 
Greens made a respondent more likely to oppose such 
programs. 
•	 There was considerable ambivalence among the survey 
participants towards online government data matching 
programs. We found that 42% were in favour and 
45% were opposed to a program that tracked citizen 
use of public services and benefits. The members of 
our online focus group were also sharply divided on a 
range of data matching scenarios put to them.
4.1 Legal and policy issues in 
government collection and use of 
data
Governments are keen to use the capacities of data 
analytics to better plan and efficiently target government 
services and spending, to enable more effective 
law enforcement and to boost local innovation and 
the development of commercial services based on 
government data (such as real-time, third-party public 
transport apps like TripView and Moovit).
But data matching and use of data analytics by 
government, or by government sharing data with 
the private sector, raise distinct questions about the 
power of the state and the nature and sheer scale 
of the data governments possess. Individuals in 
general have less choice about providing personal 
information to governments. They also typically see less 
immediate, personal benefit from doing so (Productivity 
Commission, 2017).
The Australian Productivity Commission’s March 2017 
Data Availability and Use report examined opportunities 
and issues arising from increasing access to, and 
availability and linking of, data between government 
agencies, as well as expanding sharing of data 
between the public sector, private sector, researchers 
and academics, and the broader community. The 
Commission’s report constitutes the first attempt 
to comprehensively review the use of data within 
government and across sectors in Australia. 
The Commission noted that Australia’s legal and policy 
frameworks for collection, storage and use of public- and 
private-sector data are ad hoc and not contemporary, 
and that, as a result, Australia is not participating in 
developments in the use of data or benefiting from 
data-driven services and efficiencies. The Productivity 
Commission called for fundamental, systematic change 
in the ways governments, businesses and individuals 
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handle data (Productivity Commission, 2017, p. 12). The 
Commission’s framework would both increase potential 
for data sharing and release, and give Australians more 
control over their digital data.
The Productivity Commission is not alone in its views. 
The Australian Computer Society recently released a 
Technical White Paper on Data Sharing Frameworks 
with a view to supporting the development of smart 
services and a better understanding of a wider network 
of individuals and (government and private) services and 
service providers (Australian Computer Society, 2017). 
The ACS White Paper, like the Productivity Commission 
report, highlighted the potential benefits of data-
sharing within and across sectors. The White Paper also 
highlights the fundamental challenges that lie in the 
interface between technical needs for precise concepts 
and definitions, and legal and ethical frameworks that 
tend to be nuanced and based on fuzzy standards like 
reasonableness. The White Paper supports the need 
to develop clear and concise legal, policy and ethical 
frameworks to enable data-sharing while still protecting 
individuals’ rights, including their privacy – as well as to 
confront the difficult questions around data use: Just 
because we can, should we? 
At the same time that this high-level policy discussion 
around the potential of government and private sector 
data-sharing is occurring, Australia has seen some 
high-profile debates related to government collection, 
storage and use of data and data matching, especially 
in the law enforcement context. One significant policy 
shift in recent times has been the introduction of a legal 
obligation on telecommunications providers to store 
metadata – data about individuals’ use of internet and 
phone services (such as what numbers people have 
called, when and for how long) without including the 
content of communications (Leonard, 2016). These 
developments are discussed further below.
Another public debate arose when the government 
undertook large-scale matching of tax data with 
information about government benefits – and used 
that information to send debt notices to past welfare 
recipients. Both debates are discussed further below, 
and both provided some specific questions for 
consideration in our study.
The Productivity Commission and the ACS White Paper 
both emphasise the importance of trust and the social 
licence for the continued collection and use of data. In 
this context, understanding public support (or lack of it) 
for the use and collection of data, and the conditions 
people place on their support, are important if we are to 
respond to calls to develop new legal, policy and ethical 
frameworks to successfully navigate this rapidly changing 
environment.
4.2 General attitudes towards 
government and government-
mandated data collection
In Chapter 3, we reported survey data on whether 
people were concerned about corporations, other 
people or governments violating their privacy. Chapter 3 
reported that while a majority agreed that they were 
concerned about their privacy being violated by 
corporations (57%), a substantial number remained 
concerned about violations by government (47%).
Table 4.1 breaks down the data relating to respondents’ 
concerns about violations by government (for equivalent 
tables regarding violations by corporations and 
individuals, see Chapter 3). In terms of governments and 
other people violating privacy, there were few differences 
between sub-groups. The most substantial differences in 
view are related to partisanship. Green voters were most 
likely to be concerned about governments violating their 
privacy (54%) and Coalition voters were the least likely to 
be concerned (38%). The group of people not concerned 
about governments violating their privacy is small overall 
(16%) with a large group (37%) not prepared to either 
agree or disagree with the suggestion that they had 
concerns. 
Table 4.1: I am concerned governments are 
violating my privacy online (n=1603)
Agree Neither Disagree
Age
Under 40 50 35 15
40–59 45 41 15
60+ 44 37 19
Gender*
Male 50 35 15
Female 43 40 17
Education
High school 47 35 18
Technical 43 41 16
University 48 37 15
Posting
At least once a day 56 28 16
At least once a week 47 38 15
At least once a month 48 37 16
Less often or never 44 40 16
Party*
Labor 50 37 14
LNP 38 40 22
Greens 54 31 15
Other 50 33 17
None/DK 48 40 12
TOTAL (%) 47 37 16
TOTAL (n) 747 601 255
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4.4 Government-mandated 
retention of communications-
related data
We sought to investigate respondents’ attitudes towards 
the retention of metadata through a series of questions, 
with more or less specificity about the purpose of the 
collection or use. 
Table 4.2 sets out responses when we asked generally 
whether respondents considered phone companies 
should be required to keep information about who was 
called and when there was a breach of privacy, without 
specifying the purpose of collection. 
We found that 79% of respondents considered this to 
be a breach of their privacy. The high school educated 
(84%), Greens identifiers (84%) and women (83%) were 
most likely to agree that this was a privacy breach, while 
Coalition identifiers were significantly less likely to see it 
as a breach (73%) – although that figure still represents a 
substantial majority. 
We also asked about internet communications, again 
without specifying any particular purpose for the 
requirement for internet service providers to keep 
metadata. When the question was framed in this 
way, only 31% (overall) were in favour of a general 
requirement for internet service providers to keep 
metadata, with a majority (58%) opposed to this policy. 
Those most likely to be in favour included Coalition 
identifiers (46%), everyday social media posters (39%) 
and the university educated (35%). Those most likely to 
be opposed were Greens identifiers (65%). 
4.3 Australia’s shift to require 
retention of data about 
communications (metadata)
The Commonwealth Government introduced wide-
ranging and mandatory metadata retention provisions 
under the Telecommunications (Interception and 
Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Act 2015 (Cth). 
The obligations under this Act came into full effect on 
14 April 2017, and required telecommunications service 
providers to retain specified metadata for at least two 
years (Leonard, 2016). 
Metadata is complex to define, but can broadly be 
characterised as the background technical information 
generated by an electronic communication, excluding 
the content of the communication itself. Metadata 
encompasses information including when, where, how 
and with whom a communication occurs via phone or 
the internet, as well as information about internet usage, 
uploads and downloads, email addresses and call-related 
features used on a mobile phone. 
What people say in an email or on the phone is, of 
course, informative, but even without a transcript, 
information about the email or call can be revealing. 
Who are you talking to? When and where were you when 
you had the conversation? A series of conversations 
with a cancer clinic, for example, could reveal that 
a person has cancer. Repeated conversations with a 
political organisation like Getup! could reveal political 
orientations, especially if coincident with known 
advocacy campaigns. Over time, metadata can create 
insights into a person’s individual patterns of behaviour, 
including their geographical location, associations and 
interactions with other people in Australia and overseas, 
as well as information that may be gleaned about their 
daily routine, interests, education, political and religious 
opinions, medical conditions and personal lives. 
Prior to the introduction of the 2015 Act, metadata 
was routinely accessed for law enforcement and 
intelligence purposes, but retention practices varied 
significantly. Debate surrounding the passage of 
the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) 
Amendment (Data Retention) Act 2015 (Cth) was 
framed by both the Coalition government and the 
Labor Opposition as a matter of national security, and 
as key to counter-terrorism efforts. Senator Mitch Fifield, 
then Manager of Government Business in the Senate 
and Assistant Minister for Social Services, stated in the 
Second Reading Speech that the passage of the Bill 
was crucial to ‘prevent the capabilities of Australia’s law 
enforcement and national security agencies being further 
degraded’ because ‘access to metadata plays a central 
role in almost every counterterrorism, counterespionage, 
cybersecurity and organised crime investigation’ 
(Commonwealth of Australia, Senate, 24 March 2015). 
The potential set of persons who can seek access 
to metadata is, however, potentially broader than 
just Australia’s national security agencies: it currently 
includes both the Australian Securities and Investment 
Commission and the Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission, as well as the Australian Border 
Force. To date, a much longer list of organisations 
(like local councils) who applied for access have not 
been added to the approved list, and metadata is not 
available to civil litigants (Australian Government, 2017).
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Table 4.2: Is it a breach of privacy if the 
government requires my phone company to 
keep information about who I call and when?
Breach Not breach
Age
Under 40 79 21
40–59 81 19
60+ 78 22
Gender*
Male 76 24
Female 83 17
Education*
High school 84 16
Technical 76 24
University 78 22
Posting
At least once a day 80 20
At least once a week 79 21
At least once a month 83 17
Less often or never 80 20
Party*
Labor 82 18
LNP 73 27
Greens 84 16
Other 76 24
None/DK 83 17
TOTAL (%) 79 21
TOTAL (n) 1192 309
Table 4.3: Do you favour or oppose the 
government requiring internet service providers 
to store information about who you contact, 
when, and what websites you visit (n=1603)
Favour Unsure Oppose
Age*
Under 40 30 14 56
40–59 30 12 58
60+ 34 6 60
Gender
Male 32 11 57
Female 30 12 58
Education*
High school 27 12 61
Technical 29 13 57
University 35 9 56
Posting*
At least once a day 39 8 53
At least once a week 35 9 56
Favour Unsure Oppose
At least once a month 29 10 61
Less often or never 24 14 62
Party*
Labor 30 8 62
LNP 46 7 47
Greens 24 10 65
Other 30 8 62
None/DK 22 20 59
TOTAL (%) 31 11 58
TOTAL (n) 500 179 924
When a law enforcement or national security angle was 
added to the question, however, support rose. Thus, 
when asked whether they favour law enforcement and 
security agencies being able to access metadata, the 
number in favour jumped up to 42%, and 47% opposed. 
Coalition party identifiers (54%) remain the groups 
most likely to favour this kind of access. Green party 
identifiers were the only group to significantly oppose 
this policy (57%). 
Table 4.4: Do you favour or oppose law 
enforcement and security agencies being able 
to access information about who you contact, 
when, and what websites you visit (n=1603)
Favour Unsure Oppose
Age*
Under 40 40 14 45
40–59 41 12 47
60+ 46 5 50
Gender
Male 42 11 48
Female 42 12 46
Education
High school 39 13 48
Technical 41 13 46
University 44 9 47
Posting*
At least once a day 49 7 43
At least once a week 46 8 46
At least once a month 39 12 49
Less often or never 36 17 48
Party*
Labor 42 9 49
LNP 54 6 40
Greens 35 7 57
Other 41 9 50
None/DK 34 20 46
TOTAL (%) 42 11 47
TOTAL (n) 672 179 752
25Government data-matching and surveillance
The responses shifted even further once the question 
was framed in terms of anti-terrorism efforts. We asked 
about a government program to collect communications 
of nearly all internet users as part of anti-terrorism 
policies. Here the majority of respondents (57%) are 
in favour while only 31% oppose this kind of program. 
Interestingly, these results echo Roy Morgan survey 
results regarding the Australian government’s new 
‘anti-terror’ laws requiring state governments to provide 
licences for mass facial-recognition technology. A 
special Roy Morgan Snap SMS Survey was conducted 
over the weekend of 7–9 October 2017, with a cross-
section of 1486 Australians aged 18+. In that survey, 
respondents were asked, ‘Under anti-terror measures 
State Governments will provide driver licence photos 
for mass facial recognition technology. Does this 
concern you?’ A total of 67.5% of survey respondents 
were not concerned, compared with 32.5% who 
expressed concern.
Those most likely to be in favour of this kind of program 
included Coalition party identifiers (69%), those aged 
over 60 (64%), everyday social media posters (62%) and 
the high school educated (62%). Greens identifiers (47%) 
were the only group significantly more likely to oppose 
this policy.
Clearly, there is salience for metadata data collection 
and surveillance when it is framed in security and anti-
terrorism terms. Privacy is important to Australians, but 
can be forsaken or traded off against security fears. 
Table 4.5: Do you favour or oppose 
a government program to collect 
communications of nearly all internet users as 
part of anti-terrorism efforts (n=1603)
Favour Unsure Oppose
Age*
Under 40 52 16 32
40–59 56 12 31
60+ 64 6 29
Gender*
Male 54 11 35
Female 59 13 28
Education*
High school 62 11 27
Technical 50 17 33
University 57 10 33
Posting*
At least once a day 62 8 30
At least once a week 57 10 33
At least once a month 57 11 33
Less often or never 53 18 30
Favour Unsure Oppose
Party*
Labor 56 10 34
LNP 69 7 24
Greens 41 12 47
Other 57 9 34
None / DK 51 21 27
TOTAL (%) 57 12 31
TOTAL (n) 909 195 499
4.5 Government data matching 
Data matching has been described broadly as the large-
scale comparison of records or files collected or held 
regarding an already identified individual for different 
purposes, with a view to detecting matters of interest. 
Data matching involves bringing together disparate 
pieces of information from different sources, and 
compiling and comparing it. Data matching is distinct 
from data linking, which involves linking identified 
databases with anonymous databases to re-identify or 
de-anonymise the previously anonymous data by linking 
and examining the digital fingerprint.
In the Australian context, data matching is generally 
carried out by Commonwealth, state and territory 
government agencies with large troves of data, such as 
the Australian Taxation Office (ATO), the Department of 
Human Services, the Department of Veterans’ Affairs, the 
Department of Immigration and Border Protection and 
the relevant health departments. The ATO also engages 
in data matching with non-government, third-party 
sources to identify fraud, including banks and financial 
institutions, online selling sites like eBay, and those 
facilitating the ‘sharing economy’, such as Uber, Airtasker 
and Airbnb. 
Until recently, there was limited ability to match the data 
held by various government entities, and little appetite 
to do so. However, in recent years government interest 
in data matching for the purposes of planning and 
targeting services has increased considerably. 
As Table 4.6 shows, there is considerable polarisation 
among the survey participants towards an online 
government data matching program that tracks citizens’ 
use of public services and benefits. We found that 42% 
were in favour and 45% were opposed to this kind of 
program (with only a small proportion unsure, compared 
with the larger ambivalent or unsure groups we saw in 
the previous chapter). 
Those most likely to be in favour included Coalition 
identifiers (54%), university educated respondents 
(48%) and men (46%); those most likely to be opposed 
included those who identified with a non-major party 
(53%) and respondents over 60 (49%).
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In keeping with the survey responses above, respondents 
in the online focus group were strongly divided about 
government data sharing and data monitoring. 
Table 4.6: Do you favour or oppose a 
government program that tracks your use of 
public services and benefits (n=1603)
Favour Unsure Oppose
Age*
Under 40 42 18 41
40–59 41 13 46
60+ 45 6 49
Gender*
Male 46 12 42
Female 39 14 47
Education*
High school 38 13 48
Technical 37 16 47
University 48 11 41
Posting*
At least once a day 46 8 46
At least once a week 42 12 46
At least once a month 42 14 43
Less often or never 37 18 45
Party*
Labor 43 10 46
LNP 54 8 38
Greens 39 12 48
Other 40 7 53
None/DK 33 22 45
TOTAL (%) 42 13 45
TOTAL (n) 677 207 719
For some, there is a clear benefit – for example, in 
government departments sharing citizen data among 
themselves for the purposes of improving service 
delivery. We asked participants, ‘How do you broadly 
feel about government departments sharing your 
personal data (including things like tax, social security, 
criminal history and medical records) between each other 
for service delivery?’ For example, participants stated:
I am happy for the government departments to share 
information. I wish my medical records could be all stored in 
one place; that way when I see a doctor from another practice 
all the information would be there and I wouldn’t have to 
explain my history over and over.
Broadly I’m okay with this. It would make some services easier 
to deliver and administer such as combining a car licence with a 
firearms licence.
There were conditions for such support, with participants 
commenting on the need for ‘BIG safeguards’ and 
accountability for abuse. Some made their support 
conditional on data sharing being confined to within-
government sharing. Two participants said they would 
only support sharing if they had given permission. 
One hypothetical scenario given to respondents was 
that of the tax office collating data in order to assist with 
individual tax returns. Half of the participants believed 
this was a good idea, given its likelihood to ensure they 
received all of their entitlements, as well as the chance to 
reduce tax evasion or fraud. However, the other half were 
not convinced, either because they believed such data 
sharing should only take place under certain conditions 
– such as where individual permission was granted, or 
there was anonymity of data, or because it was seen 
as just another means by which the government could 
surveil and monitor citizens. 
We also asked the members of the online focus group 
for their reaction if schools could share a student’s 
attendance data and personal information with 
community police in order to identify and intervene with 
students in need of support. Here, too, responses were 
polarised. Half thought this was a good idea, based 
on its ability to improve social outcomes and promote 
the public good (whether framed as ‘helping children 
in need’ or ‘helping policy catch children who break 
the law’). But the other half were strongly against such 
a proposal, seeing it as a clear instance of government 
over-reach into citizens’ lives, and as adding further 
surveillance in a society where there is already enough 
government monitoring: 
The example sounds good in theory; however, it can then easily 
be expanded into a 1984 scenario. 
Another scenario we put to the online focus group 
imagined the linking of health and travel data in order 
to notify citizens who had been in the same location 
as a person with a contagious disease such a measles. 
Again, half the respondents expressed concern about 
the proposal, describing it as ‘Big Brotherish’ or ‘creepy’. 
But half were in favour (‘I think if it’s the government it’s 
totally okay’, or ‘great idea’). Some who were supportive 
in principle, however, expressed a higher level of caution 
given the way this scenario seemed more interventionist; 
some said they would only feel comfortable if the data 
were anonymised (although this would not be possible in 
the scenario given).
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4.6 Centrelink’s data matching 
program and #notmydebt
The complex issues around data matching are 
exemplified by the #NotMyDebt social media campaign 
and subsequent parliamentary inquiry. This story started 
to attract attention online in December 2016 and 
January 2017. 
Data matching has been carried out between Centrelink 
and the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) for over 
approximately 20 years, with the aim of reducing 
fraudulent over-payments. However, this controversy 
arose in relation to an automated data matching 
procedure being used to compare income during the 
financial years from 2010–11 to 2012–13. People started 
to receive letters stating that they owed Centrelink 
significant debts as a result of over-payment of 
government entitlements.
It was subsequently revealed that Centrelink was utilising 
an ‘Online Compliance Intervention’ computer program 
that issued letters based on automated data matching 
procedures between Centrelink and the ATO. When the 
program identified a discrepancy between the annual 
total income an individual declared to the ATO and 
Centrelink’s fortnightly payment records, a letter was 
automatically generated and sent to the recipient. 
The algorithm presumed that income had been earned 
at a constant level throughout the financial year, and 
used this averaged income to estimate fortnightly 
Centrelink entitlements. The algorithm did not take into 
account fluctuations in income throughout the financial 
year, such as those working on a casual or seasonal basis. 
Moreover, the process was altered so that, instead of a 
Centrelink official liaising with the recipients’ employer 
to confirm income, this responsibility was shifted to the 
recipient. 
The automated and crude nature of the data matching 
algorithm, as well as the generation of letters demanding 
repayment of purported debt, resulted in the program 
being described colloquially as a ‘robo-debt’. The 
Senate Community Affairs References Committee 
reported that between November 2016 and March 2017, 
at least 200,000 people were impacted by this program.
In February 2017, the Senate Community Affairs 
References Committee commenced an inquiry into 
these events. The inquiry’s report, Design, Scope, Cost–
Benefit Analysis, Contracts Awarded and Implementation 
Associated with the Better Management of the Social 
Welfare System Initiative, was published in June 2017 
(Senate Community Affairs References Committee, 
2017). The Committee received 156 submissions 
and more than 1400 emails from individuals, with 
significant emphasis being placed on the personal 
and emotional impact of the program on vulnerable 
welfare recipients. The final report was very critical of the 
program, recommending that the Online Compliance 
Intervention (OCI) program should be put on hold until 
all procedural fairness flaws (and the Committee’s own 
recommendations) were addressed (Senate Community 
Affairs References Committee, 2017). The government, 
however, rejected this recommendation.

Chapter 5
Work
Core findings
•	 Digital privacy at work matters. Most Australians do 
not think employers should look at their employees’ 
social media pages. While 37% agreed that it was 
acceptable for either prospective or current employers 
to look at public social media posts, only 20% agreed 
that it was acceptable for either current or prospective 
employers to look at private posts.
•	 High school educated people, those not working in 
professional/skilled work and respondents over 40 
were most concerned about employers accessing their 
social media posts.
•	 Only 16% of people agreed that using social media 
was an important part of their job, but most of their 
workplaces (72%) had a policy about using social 
media while at work. Most workplaces seemed to 
recognise the everyday ubiquity of social media use 
and were attempting to govern it, though only 46% of 
respondents said their workplace had a policy on what 
they posted online.
•	 In this terrain of unclear directions over social media at 
work and employers’ rights to access posts, our online 
discussion groups reinforced that privacy boundaries 
were important, but also that employees needed to 
use their own ‘common sense’.
•	 The encroachment of some new policy agendas, such 
as that seen in the case study of the Public Service 
Commission, needs to better reflect citizens’ desires 
for digital privacy at and from work.
•	 The app-driven, online gig economy presents a new 
space for digital rights analysis. Most respondents 
have heard of, but not used, a platform such as Uber, 
Airtasker or Deliveroo, and use is skewed towards 
those under 40 and the university educated.
•	 Australians see gig work as providing workers with 
more flexibility, but at the same time a majority 
of people are also concerned about the financial 
insecurity of this kind of work. Over 60% of 
respondents believed that these new forms of work 
needed new government regulations. Yet, as shown 
in the case study, institutionalising fairer regulations 
is fraught.
5.1 Digital privacy at work
The social media activity of citizens has presented a 
dilemma in the employment context. Use of social media 
has become integral to many workplaces; at the same 
time, our personal lives are permeated by the use of 
social media platforms:
Where other technological developments such as email, 
mobile phones, laptop computers, and remote-access intranet 
facilities had already diffused and continue to dim the physical 
and psychological boundaries between employees’ public 
and private lives … social media developments arguably have 
intensified this penetration of employers into the personal lives 
of workers. (Thornthwaite, 2013, p. 167)
It is further noted that ‘social media provides an 
avenue potentially to expand the scope of employees’ 
obligations in their personal time, without a reciprocal 
growth in employers’ responsibilities’ (Thornthwaite, 
2013, p. 164).
In their engagements online, when do individuals 
cease to act in their private capacity and take on the 
obligations of an employee? Is there such a thing 
as digital privacy at work? What is the appropriate 
balance be found between employer rights to protect 
the reputation of their brand and employee rights to 
speak freely online? Where, in the digital realm, does an 
employee’s responsibility to their employer end? And to 
what extent should employers be allowed to monitor the 
social media communications of their employees? This is 
an area of employment relations that is still in its infancy.
In Australia, currently there is no constitutional, statutory, 
tort or common law ‘right to privacy’ that would protect 
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employees from what evidence suggests is ‘a growing 
intrusion of employer control in [employees’] private 
lives’ (Thornthwaite, 2013, p. 5). As discussed in earlier 
chapters, the concept of privacy remains contested. 
Social media use at work throws into the mix the issue 
of digital privacy. Social media use is increasingly used 
in disciplinary and dismissal decisions of employers, 
evidenced by the increasing number of unfair dismissal 
cases being brought before industrial tribunals such 
as the Australian Industrial Relations Commission and 
Fair Work Commission. Yet the key issues being raised 
about the extent to which employers can regulate what 
employees do online in their private capacity remain 
largely unresolved (Thornthwaite, 2013, p. 184).
In the survey, we asked respondents a series of questions 
about their use of social media at work and their 
perception of their rights to digital privacy while at work. 
We are interested in the idea of digital privacy and how it 
effects all areas of our lives. An initial question we asked 
was whether respondents believed that it was a breach 
of privacy if future or prospective employers looked at 
their public social media profile. This would presumably 
include a public Twitter, LinkedIn or Instagram account, 
but not a Facebook or Snapchat account, as they 
are often more private and a prospective employer 
is unlikely to be part of an existing network of family 
and ‘friends’. This question with regard to prospective 
employers draws upon the observed phenomenon 
in relation to employers’ use of social media as part 
of the ‘profiling’ of potential recruits (McDonald and 
Thompson, 2016).
Table 5.1 shows that there is some ambivalence about 
what constitutes a breach of digital privacy. In general, 
half our respondents considered that a prospective 
employer looking at a public social media profile 
constituted a breach, while half did not. There were 
no differences here by age or gender. There was a 
difference, however: those who were high school 
educated and those who lived in capital cities felt it was 
more likely to be a breach.
This trend is reinforced in the responses to the next 
question (Table 5.2), where those respondents who were 
high school educated were less likely than university-
educated respondents to see that social media was 
relevant to their job in any way. Frequent, daily social 
media posters were the group most likely to consider 
this a breach of privacy. Thus frequent and active users of 
social media were more committed to the idea that there 
was public social media posting and private posting, and 
felt that the context for digital privacy mattered.
Table 5.1: Is it a breach of privacy if a 
prospective employer looks at my public social 
media profile?
Yes, a 
breach
Age
Under 40 48
40–59 49
60+ 51
Gender
Male 49
Female 50
Location*
Capital city 52
Not capital city 46
Education*
High school 55
Technical 47
University 47
Yes, a 
breach
Posting*
At least once a 
day
64
At least once a 
week
45
At least once a 
month
46
Less often or 
never
47
TOTAL (%) 50
TOTAL (n) 746
Table 5.2 shows that only 16% of respondents agreed 
that social media was an important part of their work 
and those who agreed that social media was helpful for 
their work were skewed towards those under 40, men, 
professional workers, and frequent social media posters. 
This suggests that there may be a divide between 
public social media that is useful for paid work, versus 
the experience of most participants where social media 
use is about sociality or information gathering with 
personalised networks of family and friends.
In this context of a blurring between the use of social 
media for and in our public and private lives, we 
also asked four questions (Tables 5.3, 5.4, 5.5, 5.6) 
about whether it was acceptable for both current and 
prospective employers to look at what people post on 
social media. Overall, just over a third of respondents 
(37%) agreed that it was acceptable for either 
prospective or current employers to look at public social 
media posts, while only 20% agreed that it was okay for 
either current or prospective employers to look at private 
posts. While there is a certain amount of ambivalence 
across the sample, with 20–25% selecting ‘neither’, 
it does suggest that there are few people who really 
agree that all social media are now public, and thus it is 
perfectly acceptable for employers to access employees’ 
social media profiles and postings. This ambivalence, 
which often depends on an assertion of common-sense 
circumstances, is still underpinned by a concern for 
digital privacy and is reinforced in our qualitative online 
discussion groups, discussed below.
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Table 5.2: ‘Social media is important for 
helping me do my work or job’
Agree Neither Disagree
Age*
Under 40 27 33 40
40–59 15 27 58
60+ 2 35 63
Gender*
Male 19 32 49
Female 13 31 56
Education
High school 13 33 54
Technical 14 30 55
University 19 30 50
Posting*
At least once a day 31 29 40
At least once a week 25 35 41
At least once a month 18 40 42
Less often or never 9 27 64
Profession
Professional or skilled 24 26 50
Not professional or skilled 17 29 55
TOTAL (%) 16 31 53
TOTAL (n) 130 249 422
Table 5.3: ‘It is acceptable for current employers 
to look at your public social media posts’
Agree Neither Disagree
Age*
Under 40 43 31 26
40–59 34 28 38
60+ 32 27 41
Gender
Male 39 28 33
Female 35 29 36
Education*
High school 31 28 41
Technical 34 32 33
University 43 27 31
Posting
At least once a day 41 24 35
At least once a week 43 27 30
At least once a month 38 26 37
Less often or never 32 32 36
Profession
Professional or skilled 44 26 29
Not professional or skilled 33 32 35
TOTAL (%) 37 29 34
TOTAL (n) 295 230 276
Table 5.4: ‘It is acceptable for current 
employers to look at your private social media 
posts’
Agree Neither Disagree
Age*
Under 40 26 30 45
40–59 16 25 59
60+ 18 21 62
Gender
Male 22 24 54
Female 18 27 55
Education
High school 18 26 56
Technical 19 30 51
University 22 23 55
Posting*
At least once a day 28 19 53
At least once a week 23 27 50
At least once a month 16 25 59
Less often or never 14 29 58
Profession
Professional or skilled 24 25 51
Not professional or skilled 19 27 55
TOTAL (%) 20 25 55
TOTAL (n) 159 204 438
We did identify variation in agreement on whether it is 
acceptable for employers to access social media posts. 
Those under 40 were more likely than those over 40 to 
agree that current and prospective employers could look 
at public posts, and that current employers could look at 
private posts. A majority across all age groups disagreed 
with prospective employers looking at private posts. 
Interestingly, frequent posters were also more likely 
than infrequent posters to agree that it was acceptable 
for both current and prospective employees to look at 
social media posts. While most frequent posters still 
disagreed with accessing private posts, those who used 
social media a lot were slightly more likely to be open 
to the idea that everything is more public now, but this 
was also likely to be highly correlated with youth. Lastly, 
university educated respondents thought it was more 
acceptable for both current and prospective employers 
to look at public social media posts of employees. This 
attitude potentially comes from the point of view of 
employers as we also observe a difference between 
what professionals/highly skilled think versus those not in 
professional or skilled work. Correspondingly, those who 
had only completed high school were consistently the 
group to be least likely to agree that it was acceptable 
for any employer to look at public or private social 
media posts – potentially these are the least powerful 
employees, who are most subject to this kind of 
infringement on their digital privacy.
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Table 5.5: ‘It is acceptable for prospective em-
ployers to look at your public social media posts’
Agree Neither Disagree
Age*
Under 40 41 31 27
40–59 35 28 38
60+ 36 25 39
Gender
Male 38 28 34
Female 37 29 35
Education*
High school 28 30 42
Technical 34 32 33
University 45 25 30
Posting
At least once a day 38 25 37
At least once a week 42 25 33
At least once a month 42 25 34
Less often or never 31 35 34
Profession*
Professional or skilled 45 28 27
Not professional or skilled 35 27 38
TOTAL (%) 37 28 34
TOTAL (n) 300 227 274
Table 5.6: ‘It is acceptable for prospective em-
ployers to look at your private social media posts’
Agree Neither Disagree
Age*
Under 40 23 30 47
40–59 16 27 57
60+ 20 22 58
Gender
Male 20 27 53
Female 19 26 55
Education
High school 16 30 54
Technical 19 30 51
University 22 23 55
posting*
At least once a day 25 27 48
At least once a week 26 24 49
At least once a month 14 26 60
Less often or never 14 29 57
Profession
Professional or skilled 21 28 51
Not professional or skilled 20 27 53
TOTAL (%) 20 27 54
TOTAL (n) 157 213 431
5.2 Workplace social media policies
As we will explore further below, workplace policy 
and government regulation of employers’ access to 
employees’ use of social media at work has not kept 
pace with the reality of social media usage. In the survey, 
we asked respondents whether their workplaces had a 
policy about social media use at work and individual’s 
presentation of themselves online. While most of their 
employers had polices on private use, a minority had 
policies on the actual content of social media posting: 
while 72% said their workplace had ‘policies or rules 
about using social media while at work’, only 46% said 
their workplace had ‘policies or rules about how you 
present yourself on the internet, for example, what you 
can post on blogs and websites, or what information you 
can share about yourself online’.
In the online discussion group, we asked participants 
a series of questions about how they felt about the 
use of social media at work, with a focus on employers 
accessing their personal social media feeds. Regarding 
whether employers should have a right to look at an 
employee’s social media, most participants tended 
towards ‘no’; this view was more strongly articulated 
when it came to ‘private’ versus ‘public’. For example:
Personally I don’t think an employer should have any 
control over an employee’s social media. That being 
said, employees should refrain from any negativity 
pertaining to employment as social media whinging 
won’t fix the problem. Employees in high-profile or 
government jobs should do the same and show common 
sense in what they post.
However, this was also qualified by several participants 
as an onus on the employee to use their ‘common 
sense’ and self-restraint. Few people believed social 
media should be cart blanche for employees to say what 
they wanted regarding their employers. And only a few 
people referred to the importance of a social media 
policy to define any boundaries and expectations of both 
parties. For example:
I don’t think they should have control over what employees 
post in their private time … For sure. Someone working in the 
government would obviously have a strict guideline as to what 
can be posted where.
I don’t think any employer should have control over someone’s 
social media or monitor it in any way [but] someone who works 
for the government should have common sense in regards to 
what they post, but so should all employees no matter where 
they work.
I think it depends on the role the person is in … I feel people 
need to be smart about what they put on social media and not 
mention work.
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Others saw it more concretely as employees having 
obligations, and focused on the rights of employers 
to monitor and control their employees’ inappropriate 
social media use. For example:
They pay our wage and we should be loyal to them. We would 
not like our employer to damage us on social media, would we?
I don’t think an employee should comment negatively about 
their work. if you don’t like your job, leave! They pay our wages! 
It’s common sense.
5.3 Social media and public sector 
employees – Australian Public 
Sector Commission Social Media 
Guidelines 2017
In August 2017, the Australian Public Sector Commission 
(APSC) circulated to Australian public servants (APS) a 
new iteration of its guidance to employees on social 
media use entitled Making Public Comment on Social 
Media: A Guide for Employees. The guide was the 
outcome of a consultation process undertaken with APS 
agencies and employees in late 2016. According to 
the APSC, the new guidelines were no more restrictive 
than previous policy settings, but rather addressed 
ambiguities and ‘clarifie[d] the parameters around what 
public servants can and cannot say’ (Lloyd, 2017).
In essence, the APS guidelines describe the dilemma 
as the need to balance the right of APS employees 
to participate in public and political debate with 
the statutory responsibilities of public servants of 
the Commonwealth, under the Public Service Act 
1999’s Code of Conduct (section 13). The employee’s 
responsibility in order not to act in breach of the Code, 
as summarised by the guide, is to ‘act in a way that does 
not undermine the public’s confidence in them and 
their ability to act impartially and to deliver government 
services professionally and without bias’ (APSC, 2017, 
pp. 2–3).
The clarification the guide intends to bring centres 
around the question of what constitutes a breach versus 
what constitutes acceptable conduct regarding an 
employee’s speech in the digital sphere, and in particular 
on social media. The key basis for distinction between 
offline and online comments, according to the guide, is 
‘the speech and reach of online communication’ and the 
fact that ‘material posted online is available immediately 
to a wide audience’ (APSC, 2017, p. 2). In other words, 
since there always exists a potentially wide audience for 
speech online, it will be subject to a tougher protocol.
While this might sound a necessary and reasonable 
precaution, given the importance of APS employees 
being perceived to be impartial in their provision of 
service to the public, the APSC social media guidelines 
represent a significant shift in the balancing of employee 
rights versus responsibilities that warrants deeper 
consideration. Integral to this is the distinction between 
‘public’ and ‘private’. The guidelines state that, given 
that comments on social media involve an existing 
or potential audience, any comment made – even if 
intended as private by the employee – is in fact public. 
This is the case even if the person has the highest privacy 
settings possible, is using their own private equipment 
after work hours and is sending a private email to a 
friend:
Public comment includes anything that you say in public or 
which ends up in public. This can include something you’ve said 
or written to one person. If your comment has an audience, or a 
recipient, it’s a public comment. (APSC, 2017)
An employee may even be at risk of breaching the Code 
for inaction, if they fail to remove ‘objectionable material’ 
that another person posts to their page. In effect, the 
guidelines suggest that all social media commentary 
of APS employees is considered to be done in their 
capacity as an employee, and is therefore regulated by 
their responsibilities under the Act.
What about the digital rights of APS employees? 
Although there is currently no statutory or case law 
on ‘right to privacy’ in Australia that would limit the 
extent to which employer can intrude upon the private 
lives of their employees, to the extent that this policy 
has been tested for its compliance, it would seem the 
legality of the current APSC social media guidelines 
is questionable. In the recent case of Daniel Starr v 
Department of Human Services [2016] FWC 1460, the 
Fair Work Commission concluded that the comments 
made on social media by Starr, an APS employee, 
‘even if they are offensive, made in a private capacity 
but which relate to work, are not sufficient grounds 
for the termination of employment in the absence 
of some actual (rather than perceived or potential) 
reputational damage to the employer’ (CPSU, 2017). The 
Commission’s judgment specifically called into question 
the legality of the social media policy of the APSC and 
other corresponding APS agencies.
There is little doubt that social media communications 
blur the line between conventional notions of private 
and public, and between work and non-work life. More 
thinking needs to be done on how this translates into 
employment contexts. Currently, APS employees are 
being asked to bear the weight of the unresolved 
dilemma – of how to balance the employer’s risk of 
reputational damage, and the employee’s right to 
digital privacy – through the implied extension of their 
obligations into their personal time and their private 
social media use (Thornthwaite, 2013, p. 164).
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I think employers should monitor employees’ behaviour on 
social media in order to mitigate any potential reputation 
risk, breach of data confidentiality and leakage of sensitive 
information.
We also asked participants to reflect on whether it 
mattered what kind of organisation employees worked 
for, particularly differences between public sector and 
private sector jobs. Most did not think there was a 
difference, as employees were entitled to privacy, but 
thought they should use their ‘common sense’ no matter 
what job, and employers should have clear policies. For 
example:
I don’t think it should make any difference who you work for, 
your employer should not be allowed to dictate what you do 
in your private life, but … they do! I work for the Education 
Department and it is made clear to us that there are things we 
should not be doing with regards to social media.
The ability to complain on social media is a big yes for me, 
without the employer restricting what I can say, as long as I 
don’t complain about any consequences. An employer should 
be very clear in an employment contract of any consequences 
that may be imposed if an employee states negative, 
slanderous or inaccurate comments that could harm the ‘brand’ 
of the employer.
I do believe they should have some control … for example if 
you work in the public sector and your comments could affect 
the work. If you use your social media at home in your own 
time, no they should not have any control over it. [But if you are 
friends with people who you work with] this could be a problem 
also … I know this from personal experience.
We also asked further about employers monitoring 
private social media activity of employees. Most said 
it was an invasion of privacy, and that there was little 
difference between the rights of public and private 
sector employees. Some qualified their answers by 
suggesting that people should be more thoughtful 
about what they post and not actually post about their 
employers.
I don’t mix business with my personal time.
I don’t think an employer should have access. But as humans 
if we have a problem either talk about it to friends/family/the 
boss or shut up.
No to both. They should not be able to have access as such, but 
I still believe we should not discuss our employer on any site.
No to accessing private account, but yes to a difference 
between public and private – might need to monitor SM 
accounts.
People need to be aware that anything posted on social 
media is never truly ‘private’.
Overall, two-thirds of people believed employers 
shouldn’t look at public social media accounts of 
employees, and this increased to 80% for private use. 
However, at the same time, there was a dominant view 
that the onus should be on the employee and individual 
choice regarding what to post about work – that is, a 
situation of atomised responsibility. Respondents don’t 
seem to have equated the new work environment with 
the old work environment, where an employer listening 
to private conversations (e.g. phone tapping) would have 
been unacceptable; instead, they seem to have adjusted 
responsibility according to platform capabilities. Very 
few people spontaneously suggested the need for a 
regulatory framework or a social media policy that would 
outline the expectations of this relationship between 
employers and employees and accessing personal social 
media accounts.
5.4 Social media and the private 
sector
Social media policies are becoming increasingly 
common, not only in public sector agencies but 
also in private corporations. In December 2010, the 
Commonwealth Bank of Australia (now CommBank) 
issued a social media policy to staff which soon 
afterwards came under fire from the Financial Services 
Union (FSU) for being overly restrictive on employees’ 
freedom of expression. The policy went beyond 
the regulation of commentary about the employer, 
customers, other employees and contractors; it also 
required staff to report co-workers who violated the 
policy. In that case, the FSU push-back was successful, 
as the policy was revised around mid-2011 so that 
employees would no longer be obliged to report on the 
actions of others.
In another significant Australian case, Escape Hair Design 
(2010) 204 IR 292; [2010] FWA 7358, the plaintiff had 
written on Facebook:
Xmas ‘bonus’ alongside a job warning, followed by no holiday 
pay!! Whoooooo! The hairdressing Industry rocks, man!!! 
AWESOME!!!’
The Fair Work Commission found that, while ‘foolish 
and silly in the context of them being made on a public 
forum’, the comments did not justify dismissal. However, 
the Commissioner did say in making the judgment 
that, given the nature of posting online and the fact the 
audience to a comment cannot be controlled, ‘[it] is no 
longer a private matter but a public comment’ and that 
‘it would be foolish of employees to think they may say 
as they wish on their Facebook page with total immunity 
from consequences’ (Thornthwaite, 2013: 176).
The AIRC and FWC cases in recent years have also 
included cases regarding employer use of an employee’s 
social media accounts as a source of evidence to warrant 
their dismissal. A 2012 survey in the United States 
found ‘as many as 33 per cent of organizations with 
a social media policy had disciplined employees for 
inappropriate use of social media’ (Lam, 2016). However, 
privacy arguments have not always held up in court, 
with a 2010 case in New York concluding that ‘as neither 
Facebook nor MySpace guarantee complete privacy, 
plaintiff has no legitimate expectation of privacy … 
notwithstanding her privacy settings’ (Lam, 2016).
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5.5 Emerging issues and new 
platforms in the gig economy
In the project, we were also interested in assessing how 
digital platforms are changing the current practice and 
future of work, and what Australians perceive to be the 
risks and benefits of emerging models of platform-based 
work. Part of the changing nature of work is the growing 
precarity and insecurity of work and the workplace for 
a growing proportion of workers, especially younger 
people with limited education qualifications. We asked 
respondents whether they were concerned about losing 
their jobs due to a series of threats and changes in the 
nature of work. A majority were not too concerned 
or concerned at all about these changes and, as the 
list below shows, were least concerned about robots, 
computer algorithms and obsolete technical skills 
making them redundant:
•	 41% were very or somewhat concerned about ‘Losing 
your job because your employer finds someone who is 
willing to do your job for less money’
•	 34% were very or somewhat concerned about ‘Losing 
your job because your employer uses machines or 
computer programs to replace human workers’
•	 30% were very or somewhat concerned about ‘Losing 
your job because you aren’t able to keep up with the 
technical skills required to do it’
•	 28% were very or somewhat concerned about ‘Losing 
your job or missing a job opportunity because of 
material posted by, or about, you on social media’.
We then asked respondents about whether they had 
used new gig economy platforms and what they thought 
about the work opportunities they presented. In our 
survey, we used the definition of ‘gig work’ as: ‘These 
workers typically do not follow a set schedule, and get 
paid as they pick up assignments instead of receiving an 
hourly wage or salary.’
We initially asked respondents about which gig economy 
platforms they had used. It was discovered that
•	 25% had used Uber, a ride-sharing platform similar to 
taxis (this rose to 43% of those under 40 and 37% of 
those with a degree); only 9% of respondents had not 
heard of Uber
•	 19% had used Foodora or Deliveroo, new food 
delivery apps that pay workers per delivery (this rose 
to 30% of those under 40 and 26% of those with a 
degree; 31% had never heard of these new platforms
•	 7% had used Airtasker, a platform to bid for one-off 
piece work tasks; 36% had never heard of the platform.
Respondents were asked whether they agreed or 
disagreed with a list of potential benefits or downsides 
of app-driven gig work. Nearly three-quarters of 
respondents shown in Table 4.7 believed that the gig 
economy provided workers with flexibility; however, 
those who were probably most likely to be in these 
jobs – young people aged under 40, and those with a 
high school level education – were less likely to agree 
that they were great for people who wanted flexibility. 
Table 5.8 shows that only 50% of respondents agreed 
that gig work jobs are a good entry-level job for people 
who are entering the workforce. Again those with a high 
school level education were least likely to agree with 
this proposition.
Table 5.7: Gig work jobs are great for people 
who want a flexible schedule
Agree Neither Disagree
Age*
Under 40 66 26 8
40–59 76 22 2
60+ 72 26 1
Gender
Male 68 27 5
Female 75 22 4
Location
Capital city 73 22 5
Not capital city 69 28 3
Education*
High school 64 34 3
Technical 69 25 6
University 78 17 4
TOTAL (%) 72 24 4
TOTAL (n) 573 195 33
Table 5.8: Gig work jobs are a good entry 
level job for people entering the workforce
Agree Neither Disagree
Age
Under 40 52 36 13
40–59 51 39 10
60+ 45 47 7
Gender
Male 49 41 10
Female 50 39 10
Location
Capital city 52 37 11
Not capital city 46 44 10
Education*
High school 40 52 8
Technical 55 36 9
University 53 34 13
TOTAL (%) 50 40 10
TOTAL (n) 399 319 83
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Yet when we asked respondents whether gig work 
provided career opportunities the numbers agreeing 
dropped to 29% in Table 5.9, but university-educated, 
and those living in capital cities were significantly more 
optimistic about careers from gig work.
We also asked about a potential downside to gig work 
(Table 5.10) – whether it leaves workers financially 
insecure. Only 13% of respondents disagreed, with 
41% agreeing and the remainder neither agreeing nor 
disagreeing. University educated people and those 
under 40 were significantly more likely to agree that gig 
work was financially insecure. As it is a relatively new 
phenomenon, there is a great deal of uncertainty among 
our respondents about what gig work might provide for 
workers. For more secure and older workers, it may also 
not be a scenario they have thought about much, as it is 
neither work they will do nor a service they have used.
Table 5.9: Gig work jobs are the kind of jobs 
you can build a career out of
Agree Neither Disagree
Age
Under 40 31 40 29
40–59 30 47 24
60+ 27 51 22
Gender
Male 30 44 27
Female 29 46 24
Location*
Capital city 32 42 26
Not capital city 25 51 25
Education*
High school 26 56 19
Technical 30 48 22
University 32 37 32
TOTAL (%) 29 45 25
TOTAL (n) 236 362 203
Table 5.10: Gig work jobs leave workers 
financially insecure
Agree Neither Disagree
Age*
Under 40 47 40 13
40–59 43 47 11
60+ 31 54 15
Gender
Male 41 46 13
Female 42 46 13
Location
Capital city 43 44 13
Not capital city 39 48 12
Education*
High school 36 54 10
Technical 32 55 13
University 51 35 14
TOTAL (%) 41 46 13
TOTAL (n) 332 367 102
As we were also interested in regulation of and for 
digital rights, we asked respondents about what kind of 
regulation might become necessary for workers in the 
online gig economy. Table 5.11 shows that 61% thought 
new regulations were necessary, although these were 
evenly split between a fully regulated gig economy and 
those who thought regulations should focus mainly on 
employment relations. There were few demographic 
differences between these two forms of regulation, 
except that people over 60 were slightly more in 
favour of employment-focused regulations. As we were 
asking about government regulations, we also looked 
at whether political partisanship made a difference 
to what kind of regulation was preferred. There were 
no differences between major party preferences, but 
Greens identifiers were the group most likely (45%) to 
favour new employment-related regulations for the gig 
economy.
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Table 5.11: Which ONE of the following 
statements about government regulation of 
any of these online gig work platforms do 
you agree with most?
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Age*
Under 40 34 31 13 21
40–59 29 28 7 36
60+ 28 34 11 26
Gender
Male 30 31 12 27
Female 31 31 9 29
Location
Capital city 32 31 10 27
Not capital city 28 31 11 30
Education*
High school 28 28 7 38
Technical 30 29 12 30
University 33 34 12 21
Party*
Labor 33 30 7 30
LNP 33 35 13 19
Greens 23 45 10 22
Other 33 28 15 24
None/DK 26 24 11 39
TOTAL (%) 30 31 10 28
TOTAL (n) 244 247 84 226
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5.6 Regulating gig workers’ rights
Whether labelled the ‘sharing’, ‘on-demand’, or ‘gig’ 
economy, communication technology transformations 
are restructuring the labour market and changing the 
way people work. With digitally mediated platforms 
facilitating interaction between individual consumers 
and corporations, Uber, Airtasker, Foodora and Amazon 
Mechanical Turk are ‘brokering’ a new workplace 
infrastructure. While the nature and terminology of this 
form of digitised work vary widely, the ‘gig’ economy is 
typified by several common features, including irregular 
hours driven by consumer demand, compensation on a 
piecework basis rather than a set salary, worker-supplied 
equipment and/or workplace, and the mediation through 
a digital platform or app (Stewart & Stanford, 2017). 
While precarious work featuring irregular hours and 
piecework compensation is not a new phenomenon 
(Lewchuk, 2017), the scale and ubiquity of the online gig 
economy creates additional issues for regulators and 
policy-makers (Stewart & Stanford, 2017). As much as 
these developments are heralded by some as cutting 
transaction costs and reducing barriers to entry into 
work, they are coming under increasing scrutiny in 
relation to the casualisation and informalisation of work 
(De Stefano, 2016), as well as worker rights and labour 
market regulation.
Uber was founded in 2009, and grew exponentially 
from an entrepreneurial start-up to a multibillion dollar 
multinational corporation (Martin, 2016). It is now the 
world’s largest ridesharing company, which has seen 
its operations spread to almost 70 countries. Uber’s 
business model is based a network of ‘partner-drivers’, 
who are deemed ‘independent contractors’ rather than 
Uber employees (Stewart & Stanford, 2017). In the 
United States, for example, Uber claims that its platform 
and others like it are ‘boosting the incomes of millions 
of American families. They’re helping people who are 
struggling to pay the bills earn a little extra spending 
money or transitioning between jobs’ (Aloisi, 2016, note 
81). However, Uber drivers in America not only pay their 
own insurance, maintenance and petrol costs; their right 
to drive can be terminated at any time by the company 
and rates changed without notice. Furthermore, they 
are not covered by any existing US employment law 
such as minimum wage, overtime or anti-discrimination 
legislation (Aloisi, 2016, p. 673). Uber therefore exhibits 
an unusual degree of control over its ‘partner-drivers’ 
in a manner that is not common elsewhere in the gig 
economy (Stewart & Stanford, 2017, p 424).
In a 2015 class action lawsuit brought to the Northern 
District of California Court, four Uber drivers sued the 
platform on the basis that they were employees under 
California law, and that, as such, Uber had violated the 
California Labor Code. The dispute centred on whether 
the drivers were employees of Uber or ‘independent 
contractors’. This question, in turn, rested in large part 
on how Uber should be characterised under the law. 
While Uber referred to itself as a ‘technology company’, 
and not as a ‘transportation company’, the plaintiffs 
disagreed, pointing to Uber’s previous references to 
itself as an ‘on-demand Car service’ or ‘everyone’s 
private driver’. Set for trial in June 2016, the Californian 
case was settled; however, the issue of classification of 
drivers and of Uber itself remains unresolved (Aloisi, 
2016, p. 677). The case demonstrates an issue arising 
in jurisdictions elsewhere, including Australia, in which 
labour laws developed over the last century because 
of industrial action by trade unions and others – such 
as minimum wage rates and minimum work hours – do 
not apply to workers not deemed under a ‘contract of 
service’. In other words, while decent wages and working 
conditions are a fundamental right of workers under the 
International Labour Organization’s (ILO) constitution 
(Riley, 2017, p. 5), the legal manipulation of these 
commercial arrangements has seen a growing number 
of workers fall into a regulatory ‘black hole’, and into 
conditions that reflect a form of subjugated labour. Many 
drivers have been found to rely upon Uber as their main 
source of income, meaning that regulation of the gig 
economy workforce and of the terms and conditions of 
their work is vital (Riley, 2017, p. 5).
Most attempts to regulate Uber – which may or may not 
include protections of its drivers – are happening at the 
state level in Australia. For example, in Victoria there 
has been an attempt to regulate non-employed labour 
engagement contracts in the road transport industry via 
the existing Owner Drivers and Forestry Contractors Act 
2005 (Vic), with provisions that might be adapted to the 
needs of rideshare drivers. This includes standardising 
fares and compensation for costs borne by drivers, such 
as motor vehicle expenses, or a telecommunications 
provider’s charges for accessing the large amounts of 
data required to operate the app. These changes will not 
establish Uber drivers as employees, but may mitigate 
some of the current risks and lack of entitlements in their 
work arrangements (Riley, 2017).
Chapter 6
Speech
Core findings
•	 Australians are not strongly wedded to the North 
American ideal of absolute speech freedom online. 
Just over one-third (37%) of those surveyed agreed 
that they should ‘be free to say and do what I want 
online’, but 30% disagreed and one-third expressed 
reservations about the idea. People were also less 
supportive of others having that absolute freedom 
than themselves.
•	 Around half of the respondents agreed that everyone 
should have the right to online anonymity or pseudo-
anonymity, a figure that increased to 57% for those 
under 40 years. Around one-third of younger 
Australians said it was more likely that they would 
make honest and open comment on the news, talk 
about sensitive topics like sexuality or question others’ 
opinions if they had the opportunity to comment 
anonymously.
•	 Men were more likely to assert their right to free 
expression than women, reflecting the male 
dominance of everyday speech online as much as 
offline.Gender is a key variable in understanding 
attitudes to social media regulation. Men were less 
likely than women to agree with the need to remove 
instances of sexual harassment, abuse targeted at an 
individual, or hate speech that encourages violence 
against others within 24 hours. Women were less 
supportive than men of the right to anonymity.
•	 While most respondents had not experienced negative 
impacts from risky or harmful online speech, 39% had 
been affected by mean or abusive remarks and 27% 
had experienced personal content posted without 
consent. Our case study on image-based abuse 
emphasises the need for law reform and educational 
strategies to address new privacy and speech rights 
breaches.
•	 More than occurred for either work or privacy issues, 
respondents agreed that there should be more 
regulation of online discussion environments. They 
flagged the need for increased involvement by social 
media platforms in content moderation and ‘easy’ 
complaints reporting.
•	 There was a perception gap between people’s belief 
that harmful social media content was easy to get 
taken down and the procedural reality that it was not 
always straightforward and may require regulatory 
intervention to persuade the host company to act, as 
the European Commission hate speech case study 
(discussed below) suggests.
6.1 Online speech rights
Over the last decade, studies of the scope of online 
abuse in Australia (Henry, Powell & Flynn, 2017; Katz 
et al, 2014; Powell & Henry, 2015), together with high-
profile examples of hate speech, cyberbullying and 
‘revenge porn’ or image-based abuse, have underpinned 
calls for new approaches to controlling harmful speech 
online and to educating people about what is respectful, 
inclusive public talk.1 How Australians understand their 
speech rights, and what they think it is appropriate 
to say online, constitute important territory for digital 
rights research to explore, given that millions of us are 
now social media publishers and legally responsible 
for what we say in these environments. As Chapter 5 
outlined, Australian employees are increasingly subject 
to workplace codes governing what is acceptable 
online speech, even when they are communicating via 
ostensibly private social media accounts. Yet questions 
remain about what we should and shouldn’t say online, 
and who – if anyone – should regulate our talk, and these 
issues often spark polarised debates.
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On one end of the speech rights spectrum are those 
who believe early, largely North American, claims for 
the internet as a space for absolute free speech (Barlow, 
1996; De Sola Pool, 1983), beyond even the limited 
confines of the US First Amendment. On the other end 
of the spectrum are advocates and institutions seeking 
regulatory means to limit the tides of hate speech and 
gender discrimination online, and demanding new 
forms of platform accountability for content filtering. 
Recently, however, the balance has tipped towards 
those who are calling for regulatory reform. On 31 May 
2016, for example, the European Commission entered 
into the Code of Conduct for Countering Illegal Hate 
Speech Online with Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and 
Microsoft (the provider of corporate social services such 
as LinkedIn and Yammer). A key feature of this Code was 
that the major social media platforms committed to take 
down formally reported instances of hate speech within 
24 hours (European Commission, 2016b). Our research, 
then, comes at a crisis point in the free internet speech 
narrative – a moment where even US IT companies like 
GoDaddy and Google, which ordinarily would be strong 
free speech proponents, have refused to host neo-Nazi 
sites in the wake of white supremacist demonstrations 
(Mettler & Selk, 2017). In this moment, we set out to 
explore what speech rights Australians value, how they 
have been affected by risky or harmful behaviours 
and who they believe should take responsibility for 
monitoring and regulating online speech.
Australian attitudes are interesting to canvass precisely 
because there is no constitutional right to free speech in 
this country. Instead, Australia has developed a complex 
series of laws and regulatory strategies to ensure 
‘positive’ speech rights – that is, to protect against the 
risks and harms of uncontrolled speech. Australian law 
prohibits the posting of illegal or offensive content 
online that would be ‘refused classification’ under the 
Classification (Publications, Films and Computer Games) 
Act 1995 (as set out in the Online Content Scheme, 
schedules 5 and 7 of the Broadcasting Services Act 
1992). Australia also works to prevent reputational 
damage via defamation law, and racial vilification 
and cultural discrimination at both the state and 
federal levels.
Most recently, the national Office of the eSafety 
Commissioner was established under the Enhancing 
Online Safety (Intimate Images and Other Measures) 
Act 2015 (Cth) (formerly the Enhancing Online Safety 
for Children Act 2015 (Cth)). Initially, the eSafety 
Commissioner had the power to ask individuals, or 
the social media platforms on which they post, to 
remove ‘serious cyberbullying’ material that targeted 
an Australian child and was likely to seriously threaten, 
humiliate, harass or intimidate them. In May 2017, a 
legal change gave the Commissioner responsibility for 
all Australians, with a focus on people at risk of family 
or domestic violence, older Australians and those at risk 
of having intimate images of them shared without their 
consent. In total, this regulatory breadth means that 
Australian internet users are likely to have some sense 
of the ways in which speech rights are limited and why 
regulation might be necessary to support inclusive, civil 
speech online.
As a starting point to exploring attitudes to 
communicative rights, we began by probing how people 
saw their rights to free speech in relation to others, and 
the importance that they might place on having certain 
types of digital liberties, such as the right to anonymity 
online, or the right to speak their mind on particular 
issues such as government, religion and political 
extremism.
6.2 Attitudes to speech rights
We found that Australians are not wedded to the strong, 
North American idea of free speech online. When 
asked how strongly they agreed with the statement 
that ‘I should be free to say and do what I want online’ 
(Table 6.1) opinion was divided. Over one-third (37%) 
of respondents thought they should have that absolute 
freedom, but 30% disagreed and a third expressed 
reservations about the idea, by choosing ‘neither’.
Table 6.1: I should be free to say and do what I 
want online
Agree Neither Disagree
Age*
Under 40 50 38 12
40–59 30 34 36
60+ 27 26 47
Gender*
Male 43 31 27
Female 31 36 33
Party*
Labor 41 27 32
LNP 26 33 41
Greens 42 34 24
Other 42 29 29
None/DK 37 41 22
TOTAL (%) 37 33 30
TOTAL (n) 295 267 240
There were some clear demographic differences of 
opinion. Those under 40 were more solidly in favour of 
free speech conditions for themselves (50% agreed, 12% 
disagreed), while those over 60 were less enthusiastic 
(27% in favour, 47% against). Men were more in favour 
of untrammelled speech for themselves (45%) than 
women (33%). Those identifying with Labor, the Greens 
and minority parties were more in agreement with 
free speech rights than Liberal/National identifying 
respondents.
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Table 6.2 shows that, predictably, people were more 
likely to favour regulation of others’ speech than their 
own. Some 33% agreed others should have that absolute 
freedom, but 35% disagreed. Those under 40 were still 
more strongly in favour of free speech conditions for all 
(49% in favour, 16% opposed), while those over 60 were 
more clearly in favour of some form of regulation (26% 
in favour of free speech for all, 57% against). Again, 
men were more in favour of free speech conditions for 
all (42%) than women (27%). This gender discrepancy is 
perhaps to be expected, given that research here and 
overseas has shown that women, more than men, tend to 
be the target of cyberbullying and sexualised harassment 
or abuse (Bartlett et al., 2014; Katz et al., 2015). Again, 
Liberal/National Party identifying respondents were less 
in agreement about free speech rights for others than 
were other partisans.
Table 6.2: Everyone should be free to say and 
do what they want online
Agree Neither Disagree
Age*
Under 40 46 39 15
40–59 24 33 42
60+ 26 19 56
Gender*
Male 40 29 31
Female 26 34 40
Party*
Labor 33 34 33
LNP 25 28 46
Greens 39 26 35
Other 40 25 35
None/DK 34 38 28
TOTAL (%) 33 32 35
TOTAL (n) 264 255 283
The members of our online discussion group were 
largely supportive of the principle of free speech online, 
saying variously that there should be ‘total freedom’ of 
expression, ‘open slather’ or ‘no restrictions’ placed on 
discussions. However, half the respondents noted key 
instances where they thought there should be regulation 
– for example of hate speech, discrimination or bullying:
I think you should be able to have freedom of speech online 
but so many people cross the line and put way too much out 
there … Discrimination, racist comments should be censored.
Importantly, half our survey sample agreed that everyone 
should have the right to ‘anonymity’ online (Table 6.3), 
a term that we also took to include the capacity to post 
using a nickname or pseudonym – as distinct from the 
real-name identity systems of Facebook, Wechat and 
Google Plus.
Table 6.3: Everyone should have the right to 
anonymity online
Agree Neither Disagree
Age*
Under 40 57 30 12
40–59 41 36 24
60+ 49 30 21
Gender
Male 53 30 17
Female 46 33 20
Posting*
At least once a day 60 27 12
At least once a week 53 31 17
At least once a month 53 24 23
Less often or never 40 42 18
TOTAL (%) 50 32 19
TOTAL (n) 397 256 149
People under 40 were more likely to support anonymity 
(57%) than those over 60 (26%), possibly because they 
were more concerned than older people about being 
judged by their peers. Further, given that Chapter 5 
notes concerns about employers seeking access to 
employees’ real name social media accounts, then 
anonymous or pseudonymous social media may 
represent a haven from this form of surveillance.
Men were more likely to agree with the right to 
anonymous posting (40%) than women (26%), raising 
the question of whether Australian women are more 
concerned than men about the potential to be targeted 
by anonymous threats when they speak publicly. We 
also found that those who posted most often were 
more supportive of the right to anonymity than those 
who posted less frequently, which correlates with 
studies linking the provision of anonymity and pseudo-
anonymity with the likelihood of participation. However, 
when we asked whether Australians wanted the right to 
anonymity in order to talk about particularly controversial 
topics, we found that most people (between 62% and 
68% of respondents) reported it would make little 
difference – except for people under 40 years. Some 
38% of younger Australians said they were more likely 
to post honest and open views on the news if they had 
anonymity, while 30% were more likely to talk about 
sensitive topics like sexuality and 35% to question 
others’ opinions. For around a third of young Australians, 
the possibility of posting under an assumed name may 
enable more authentic participation in public debates.
When we explored what types of critical statements 
people felt they should be able to make openly and 
freely online (Tables 6.4 to 6.7), we found that most of 
our respondents agreed that people should be able to 
criticise government policies (56%). Older Australians 
and men were more inclined than younger people 
and women to agree that this was important, possibly 
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reflecting their greater participation in, and control of, 
traditional political organisation. Interestingly, the least 
support for this critique came from Liberal/National 
voters – traditionally supporters of free speech principles 
– and the greatest support came from supporters of the 
Greens and minor parties.2
Table 6.4: Criticisms of government policies
Agree Neither Disagree
Age*
Under 40 50 38 13
40–59 56 31 13
60+ 65 23 12
Gender*
Male 63 28 9
Female 49 35 16
Party*
Labor 59 26 15
LNP 55 30 16
Greens 72 27 1
Other 71 24 5
None/DK 43 42 15
TOTAL (%) 56 31 13
TOTAL (n) 448 252 102
There was less enthusiasm across the board for the right 
to criticise religious organisations (31%) or minority 
groups (26%), and feelings were polarised about these 
propositions, with over one-third of respondents in 
each instance disagreeing that people should be able 
to make these types of statements online. There was 
little difference in opinion about these positions across 
the survey group in terms of age, location, educational 
background, or frequency of posting, showing that these 
are very commonly held attitudes. Men were slightly 
more likely than women to agree with people’s right 
to religious and minority group critique. Minority party 
partisans were more likely to agree with criticism of 
religion and minority groups.
Table 6.5: Criticisms of religious organisations 
or religious beliefs
Agree Neither Disagree
Age*
Under 40 30 42 28
40–59 29 35 35
60+ 33 27 39
Gender*
Male 38 34 28
Female 24 37 39
Education
High school 29 41 30
Technical 32 31 37
University 32 35 34
Agree Neither Disagree
Posting
At least once a day 32 35 34
At least once a week 30 42 28
At least once a month 37 30 33
Less often or never 25 38 37
Party*
Labor 31 31 36
LNP 32 30 37
Greens 36 42 22
Other 43 29 28
None/DK 22 44 34
TOTAL (%) 31 36 34
TOTAL (n) 247 286 269
Table 6.6: Criticisms of minority groups
Agree Neither Disagree
Age
Under 40 24 40 36
40–59 25 39 37
60+ 30 32 38
Gender*
Male 32 38 30
Female 20 37 43
Location*
Capital city 26 34 39
Not capital city 25 43 32
Education*
High school 23 43 34
Technical 29 40 31
University 26 32 42
Posting
At least once a day 26 35 39
At least once a week 30 39 31
At least once a month 27 37 36
Less often or never 17 42 41
Party*
Labor 27 33 40
LNP 29 39 32
Greens 23 31 46
Other 44 28 28
None/DK 16 46 38
TOTAL (%) 26 37 37
TOTAL (n) 208 300 294
There was little taste for the right to make explicit sexual 
statements or to call for violent protests. Only 11% of 
the cohort agreed that people should be able to make 
these kinds of statements online, with men being slightly 
more in favour of explicit sexual talk than women (19% 
compared with 9%) and those under 40 being more in 
favour of calling for violent protest (20%) than those 
43Speech
over 60 (3%). Most people surveyed disagreed with the 
notion that people should be able to use the internet 
to encourage non-violent action that breaks laws they 
believe are wrong (Table 6.7). However, nearly a quarter 
of the population (23%) thought people should be 
able to do this. Frequent posters (32%) and Greens 
supporters (43%) were most in agreement with this 
principle, while older Australians (42%), Liberal/National 
and minority party supporters disagreed (46%).
While the political polarisation is not unexpected, this 
finding indicates that some internet user groups value 
the possibility to call for non-violent political action, even 
where the majority disagree with that action. Also, as 
daily posters – those most engaged in social media talk 
– were more likely to agree with this notion than those 
posting once a month or less, we could also raise the 
question of whether there is a link between the degree 
of online participation and interest in testing legal and 
political boundaries.
Table 6.7: Encouraging non-violent actions that 
break laws the person believes are wrong
Agree Neither Disagree
Age*
Under 40 28 45 27
40–59 21 37 42
60+ 20 38 42
Gender
Male 25 37 38
Female 22 44 34
Education
High school 19 43 38
Technical 24 41 36
University 27 38 35
Posting
At least once a day 32 36 32
At least once a week 23 43 34
At least once a month 25 37 38
Less often or never 19 44 37
Party*
Labor 27 41 32
LNP 21 34 46
Greens 43 36 20
Other 23 31 46
None/DK 16 50 33
TOTAL (%) 23 40 36
TOTAL (n) 188 323 291
In every instance of our speech rights questions, men 
were more likely to assert their right to free expression 
than women, reflecting the male dominance of everyday 
speech environments online as much as offline. Thus, 
despite initial hopes that the internet would develop as 
an arena for more equitable communicative rights, our 
study suggests men are still more likely than women 
to feel confident to express their rights to free speech 
online.
On a more positive note, the survey suggests that 
people understand the distinction between the need 
to enable speech that criticises government and to 
regulate speech that criticises minority groups or incites 
violent protest. This suggests a relatively sophisticated 
understanding of free speech conditions, and the means 
to build a fair, inclusive political culture online. We can 
also look, for example, to the small support for speech 
that condones non-violent law-breaking where there is 
a moral justification, to see how the internet provides 
a forum for political dissidence that would not be 
supported by mainstream media. Indeed, our discussion 
group argued that media workers should be subject to 
tighter speech regulation and more accountability online 
than ordinary citizens, with an emphasis on ensuring 
accuracy and balance or impartiality:
Yes, there should be total freedom online [but] I would support 
restrictions around media sites (not social media, but the real 
media) and government, etc. Media needs to be held to higher 
account, and factual correctness than just blogs/Twitter, etc., 
when voicing opinions.
I believe stricter rules need to be in place for media. Which 
does need to be more impartial/moderate in their views (on 
news sites, etc.).
With these outcomes in mind, it is important to ask 
whether it is due to our weak constitutional rights 
framework that people have been forced to develop 
a more nuanced imaginary of what is acceptable ‘free 
speech’ than we find realised in the more polarised 
freedom or censorship arguments that have played out 
in the United States.
6.3 The impacts of risky and 
harmful behaviours
While Australians have a robust legal framework for 
dealing with some forms of harmful and offensive 
speech, such as defamation or discrimination, our legal 
systems do not necessarily help us to negotiate what to 
do about everyday incivility: ‘mean speech’, occasional 
unwanted contacts, discrimination masquerading as 
humour, ad hominem attacks and other forms of rude, 
aggressive behaviour. Australian law is yet to adequately 
address other new and more serious forms of online 
harassment such as doxing (publishing online private 
material about someone for malicious purposes) or 
swatting (impersonating someone in order to perpetrate 
a hoax and humiliate the victim). Further, the laws 
regarding another new form of visual threat, image-
based abuse, are also inconsistent between Australian 
jurisdictions.
In this research, we wanted to explore the incidence of 
some of these behaviours alongside more serious forms 
of assault to get an idea of how they might be affecting 
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people’s interactions and their capacity to express 
themselves safely and confidently. We also wanted to 
find out how risky and harmful speech affected people’s 
publishing activities and those of any children in their 
families, and how they responded to that behaviour.
When we looked at the risks of people being exposed 
to abusive or negatively intrusive speech behaviours on 
social media platforms and elsewhere online, we found 
that, overall, the majority of Australians have escaped 
these experiences – or, rather, that they have not 
affected their online interactions (Table 6.8). We wanted 
to distinguish behaviour experienced from that which 
affects further online interactions, as we are interested in 
charting the impact of negative and risky behaviours on 
speech rights. We also found that, with one exception, 
there was little difference between the degree of abuse, 
insult or offence that women and men reported affecting 
their online interactions – even in regard to unwanted 
sexual contact.
While these are positive findings, it is important to 
note that the online activities of 39% of the Australians 
surveyed have been affected by mean or abusive remarks 
online. A fifth of respondents have been affected by racist 
comments or unwanted sexual contact (including sexting 
and solicitation), with men reporting more experience 
of racism and both genders reporting a similar degree 
of unwanted sexual contact. Just under one in five 
respondents had been affected by trolling, harassment 
and bullying. Significantly, this was far more likely to affect 
those respondents in the younger age brackets (from 33% 
of those under 30 years to 7% of those over 60).
An interesting finding was that one in four respondents 
(27%) had experienced personal information posted 
without their consent – the only category of harmful 
speech where women experienced this more than men, 
although this may have been because the posting of 
children’s photographs without consent was used as the 
example. While Australian schools have introduced strict 
controls around the taking and publication of images of 
children, the social conventions around everyday social 
media circulation of adults’ and children’s images are not 
yet clearly established.
Table 6.8: Behaviours that have affected online 
interactions
Behaviour Yes
Mean or abusive remarks 39%
Personal information posted without permission by others 
(e.g. children’s photos)
27%
Unwanted sexual contact (sexts, solicitation) 20%
Racism 20%
Trolling, harassment or bullying (sustained abuse) 18%
Impersonation or swatting (hoax calls made in your name) 13%
Personal information exposed deliberately or maliciously 
(doxing)
12%
Violent sexual contact (revenge porn, sexualised threats) 6%
To a large extent, the overall survey figures in Table 
6.8 parallel the findings of the international Microsoft 
Digital Civility Index 2017, including research conducted 
among adults and teenagers in 14 countries. The 
exception to those findings is that Australians say they 
are more affected by impersonation or swatting than 
those surveyed in other countries (13% in our survey as 
compared with 3% in the Microsoft survey).
The impacts of online impersonation can range from 
minor inconvenience, such as hoax business orders 
or fake profiles, to serious legal entanglement – for 
example, where someone contacts the police to claim 
that their target is perpetrating a crime such a murder 
or hostage-taking. It can also involve sending offensive 
emails from a victim’s account or creating fraudulent 
accounts in the victim’s name, and using them to 
embarrass or humiliate that person. Originally seen as a 
form of hoaxing or prank, in the United States swatting 
has been labelled as a new form of cyberbullying (Jaffe, 
2016). Like doxing, which in this survey affected a 
similar number of respondents (12%), and image-based 
abuse, which was relatively rare among our survey 
group, swatting is a relatively new phenomenon, which 
has a range of implications for digital rights, platform 
complaints and the legal process.
It is also clear that these harmful behaviours are affecting 
our participation in online talk and our engagement with 
social media platforms. We asked respondents whether 
they had ever reduced their comments on social media 
due to other people’s behaviour, or advised their children 
to reduce their social media use due to other people’s 
behaviour. Over one-third of parents or guardians (37%) 
have advised their children to reduce their social media 
use due to the behaviour of others, and 34% have 
reduced their own use. We also asked whether they had 
deleted a social media account due to abuse or bullying, 
or advised their child to do so. Nearly one-quarter of 
those surveyed (24%) had advised their children to 
delete a social media account due to bullying, and 16% 
had deleted one of their own accounts.
This incidence of retreat from social media interaction 
underscores the need for new regulatory strategies 
and other forms of social intervention to reduce the 
most serious forms of harmful speech. In the first of 
our our open survey questions, trolling and other forms 
of aggressive and harmful speech were listed as the 
third most important political, social or legal issue with 
internet and digital technologies that needed to be 
addressed in the next five years. Successive Australian 
governments have certainly supported anti-cyberbullying 
initiatives over two decades, and there is now a strong 
push to develop measures to combat image-based 
abuse, but this report also indicates the need for a 
broader set of educational measures to:
•	 support the reduction of everyday mean talk, and 
introduce strategies for learning constructive argument 
– especially for young people
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•	 explore what constitutes racist and sexually 
discriminatory or intimidatory talk, and how it can be 
countered.
•	 raise the serious impacts of impersonation and 
hoaxing.
•	 highlight issues of consent to post images or personal 
information about others.
More broadly, governments and civil society 
organisations need to consider the implications of having 
private companies determine what is acceptable, fair and 
inclusive public talk, and to explore ways in which they 
can collaborate on research, education and regulatory 
measures.
6.4 The case for rights education 
and law reform to tackle image-
based abuse
As online communications increasingly focus on visual 
representation, we are seeing a rise in the illegal 
distribution of sexual and/or intimate images and 
recordings without the subject’s consent, as well as the 
dissemination of faked intimate images. A recent study 
of image-based abuse notes that our understanding of 
this behaviour should extend well beyond the common 
label of ‘revenge porn’ to include any use of photos and 
videos of a sexual nature ‘to coerce, threaten, harass, 
objectify’ and denigrate someone (Henry, Powell, & 
Flynn, 2017, p. 3). As the eSafety Commission noted in 
its submission to the Commonwealth Senate Legal and 
Constitutional Affairs References Committee inquiry, 
‘non-consensual sharing of private sexual images can 
be a form of family violence or sexual abuse, and can 
also constitute cyberbullying material, and in the case of 
minors, child sexual exploitation material’ (Office of the 
Children’s eSafety Commissioner, 2016).
Image-based abuse breaches users’ privacy rights and 
can curtail their speech freedoms, particularly where 
the abusive behaviour publicly shames the victim 
or mobilises a backlash against them. Some 76% of 
those who have experienced this abuse and were later 
surveyed by the eSafety Commissioner did not take 
action to remove the images – 29% because they felt 
it wouldn’t change the situation, 22% because they 
didn’t know what to do and 29% because they felt too 
embarrassed or ashamed to act (Office of the eSafety 
Commissioner 2017).
In late 2017, the eSafety Commissioner launched an 
educational website to support Australians in identifying, 
reporting, removing and prosecuting image based 
abuse. This type of resource is critical for educating 
people about their rights to take action against 
perpetrators, as well as to suggest ways to collect and 
present evidence to a social media service or authorities. 
Importantly, it recognises the diversity of people affected 
by this type of attack, and offers tailored support advice 
for the LGBTQI communities and Indigenous Australians, 
who are disproportionately highly represented in 
statistics on this abuse.
For those seeking legal redress, at present there is no 
specific national law designating this type of abuse as a 
criminal offence. Section 474.17 of the Commonwealth 
Criminal Code 1995 does however prohibit misuse of a 
carriage service to menace, harass or cause offence, and 
carries a maximum penalty of three years’ imprisonment. 
According to the Minister for Women, Senator Michaelia 
Cash, ‘there have been a number of successful 
prosecutions for revenge porn’ using this provision 
(Goldsworthy, 2017). The Australian Government intends 
to introduce a civil penalty regime by the end of 2017, to 
be administered by the eSafety Commissioner. While not 
involving criminal prosecution, civil penalties may include 
fines, injunctions and enforceable undertakings that 
hopefully will speed up the removal of offending images 
(Department of Communications and the Arts, 2017).
In the meantime, while most Australian states and 
territories have criminal provisions to prohibit certain 
forms of image based abuse, some do not. As of 
November 2017, New South Wales, the Australian 
Capital Territory, Victoria, South Australia and Western 
Australia had all enacted new, specific criminal provisions 
relating to image-based abuse, while Queensland, 
the Northern Territory and Tasmania had not. In those 
jurisdictions without specific provisions, victims may be 
able to prosecute individuals for more general offences, 
such as stalking and harassment.This apparent legal 
inconsistency is exacerbated by the often complex 
cross-jurisdictional, transnational nature of image-based 
abuse (and online publishing more broadly). It is much 
more difficult to prosecute or remove content posted by 
actors overseas, hosted on servers outside Australia, in 
countries with no legal framework for recognising these 
acts of violence. The cross-jurisdictional dilemma for law-
makers was raised during our discussion group, with one 
participant asking how regulation of speech on social 
media could proceed when so many disparate actors, 
legal systems and territories are involved: 
‘Who would create the rules and who would police them? 
The trouble with the Internet is that it is global, so rules and 
country legal boundaries can get  blurred. If I post something 
on Facebook, is it governed by the rules of Australia (where I 
posted it) Singapore (where the server is), the USA (Facebook  
HQ) or elsewhere?’
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6.5 Online content regulation
Until recently, social media companies had carefully 
resisted calls to directly moderate the content they 
hosted, preferring to ‘empower’ people to control 
their reception of inappropriate communications by 
hiding offensive posts and banning or blocking certain 
users, as well as giving individuals reporting tools 
to flag problematic content. However, the growth in 
online misogyny and violent, sexualised harassment, 
the use of live streaming tools to represent murder or 
suicide online, and the rise of neo-Nazism and Islamic 
state terrorism have all led Western platforms like 
Facebook, YouTube, Instagram and Twitter to entertain 
new possibilities for content regulation. These include 
Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg’s 2017 promise to 
hire 3000 more moderation staff, and Alphabet and 
Facebook’s research into machine learning strategies for 
filtering written and visual content.
In our final set of survey questions, we explored 
Australians’ attitudes towards the need for content 
regulation on social media platforms, together with their 
experiences of, and beliefs about, content regulation. 
We first asked people to prioritise the forms of speech 
that they most wanted regulated, so our respondents 
were asked to nominate how important it was that 
certain types of harmful and risky content were removed 
from social media within 24 hours of posting.
The types of content that most troubled people were, 
in order, sexual harassment (88% agreed or agreed 
strongly that this should be removed quickly); abuse 
targeted at an individual (87% agreed in total); and 
hate speech that encourages violence (86% in total 
agreed). There was a somewhat lesser, but significant, 
concern about the removal of sexually explicit talk (74% 
in total agreed) and extremist political talk (73% in 
total agreed). In both those instances, people under 40 
thought it less important to take action on these types 
of speech than those over 60. Otherwise, there were 
very few demographic differences in terms of location, 
educational background, frequency of posting or 
political affiliation in people’s judgement of speech risks.
In summary, people were overwhelmingly agreed on the 
need for quick action to address harmful or risky content. 
The exception to this trend was people’s attitudes to 
anti-government talk. Overall, only 37% of the survey 
respondents thought this should be addressed by fast 
removal, although this percentage may have been 
somewhat boosted by its placement alongside other 
more harmful speech acts. Even so, it corresponds with 
the earlier finding about support for speech that criticises 
government and signals a healthy interest in robust 
political talk.
Significantly, though, without exception men were less 
concerned about the need to remove harmful content 
more quickly than women. The difference was marked in 
relation to removal of:
•	 abuse target at an individual (81% of men agreed this 
was important compared with 94% of women)
•	 sexual harassment (83% of men agreed versus 93% of 
women)
•	 hate speech that encourages violence (79% of men 
agreed versus 92% of women)
•	 sexually explicit talk women (64% of men agreed 
versus 85% of women).
Gender, then, is a key variable in understanding attitudes 
to social media regulation. Given that men play a key 
role in the design, development and operation of 
social media platforms, and are dominant in executive 
positions, it seems important to examine how gendered 
attitudes to content moderation influence corporate 
strategies, policies and practices.
Despite the keen concern survey respondents showed 
toward regulation of dangerous or risky speech, and 
the relatively common experience of abuse and mean 
speech, very few of our respondents said they had used 
a reporting function on a website or app to complain 
about inappropriate or offensive content. This lack of 
experience in reporting offensive content gives some 
context to our online group discussion, which explored 
how people would go about getting offensive and 
hateful content removed from social media feeds and 
web sites.
The majority of focus group respondents said they 
thought it was ‘easy’ to get offensive and hateful posts 
removed from social media and websites, noting that 
‘there is plenty of help from different sites to have 
things taken down’. However, some comments suggest 
respondents were talking about filtering content – 
that is, hiding or blocking posts from their personal 
feeds – rather than having them taken down. Several 
respondents noted that the ease of having inappropriate 
content removed was contextual and depended on the 
administrators’ judgement and the host service process:
I know for a fact it isn’t very easy, it may be easy to complain 
but most of the time the administrators don’t find it offensive 
and leave it.
It’s easy to remove and block things on Facebook, sometimes 
it’s as easy as clicking an option, Google is a bit harder if you 
want to remove a photo it is a process can take up to four 
weeks.
Depending on the platform it can range from extremely difficult 
to just difficult, not easy at all. A more simple and easy to 
follow process should be created with the big social media 
companies coming up with a set of guidelines (wishful thinking). 
If the offensive post was from a fake account (i.e. not from a 
confirmed person) then the post should be easy to remove, if 
it’s from a confirmed real account then the person that posted 
it should be given the opportunity to remove it and have it 
explained why it needs to be removed.
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When asked who they would approach to remove a 
hateful or offensive comment if the author refused 
to delete it, 11 of 14 respondents nominated site 
administrators as having the primary role in addressing 
complaints. However, there was also a majority 
willingness to have police involved if the matter was 
serious and the request for removal of content could 
not be resolved. As one respondent said, ‘the more 
complaints they get the sooner they will have to put 
procedures in place to deal with it’. Another respondent 
noted that the response would ‘depend on what they 
said and what my rights were’.
Our group discussion participants unanimously agreed 
that it was the responsibility of the platforms, rather than 
government or individuals, to monitor and proactively 
remove hateful or offensive content:
Facebook and social media companies have a responsibility 
to remove offensive comments and behaviour on their sites. 
It is easier if they remove it and monitor it and deal with it. 
It’s important they deal with it so they don’t encourage bad 
behaviour on their social media sites.
It’s up to the people who run the social media. They review 
problem posts and make a decision.
I think administrators are and should be responsible for 
monitoring such posts … I don’t really think government 
regulators should be involved other than in extreme 
circumstances. And yes, I believe social media platform users 
should have a say – we are, after all, the user.
Four of our group members argued that individuals must 
be responsible for what they posted, but none indicated 
that that this mitigated the need for social media 
platforms to monitor and moderate content. Six of 14 
discussants also raised the possibility of a government 
department/ombudsman/watchdog/independent 
mediating body being set up to deal with content 
removal requests, although there was some ambivalence 
from other respondents regarding any government 
intervention in content regulation. One discussant also 
raised the possibility of ‘robots’ monitoring speech 
standards, which suggests public recognition of the new 
artificial intelligence software being trialled by Google 
and Facebook as content filters.In one of our open-
ended survey questions, we asked respondents for their 
opinions on what actions social media companies should 
take to make sure that their platforms are safe, civil 
places for public discussion (see Figure 6.1). Surprisingly, 
over a third of respondents were unsure (36%). This 
indicates a great need for public discussion about the 
options for platform self-regulation and the governance 
of public speech environments, as well as exploration of 
the ways in which social media companies can work with 
users to improve the experience of social interaction.
This chapter began by probing Australian attitudes to 
free speech as litmus test in understanding their appetite 
for greater communicative freedoms. One of its central 
findings is that Australians are strongly supportive of 
greater monitoring and regulation of online speech 
environments, as well as intervention by social media 
companies in content moderation and the removal of 
harmful speech. Our respondents were also in favour 
of greater user education for better understanding of 
speech rights and responsibilities. When our discussion 
group participants were asked whether online behaviour 
is currently less controllable by law or rules than offline 
behaviour, they agreed, arguing that more rules or 
Figure 6.1 Opinions on social media self-regulation
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guidelines need to be in place for people to learn ‘what 
to share and what not to share’ ‘what can be seen and 
what can be written’ and ‘what people can post’. They 
also raised concerns about the creation of fake accounts, 
the way social media can be used to ‘destroy people’s 
lives’ and the need to have ‘more ability to remove 
what’s posted’.
It seems, however, that very few participants were aware 
of the procedural difficulties of having content removed 
from social media sites, or of the fact that the major 
platforms are reluctant to take primary responsibility 
for moderating content and devote relatively few 
resources to monitoring and responding to complaints. 
These difficulties are well documented in the European 
Commission’s 2016–17 attempts to have social media 
companies remove hate speech speedily on receipt of a 
formal complaint. Recent UK research into homophobic 
hate online has also shown that nearly half of those 
surveyed did not find it easy to report, and some of 
those who had contacted social media platforms had 
been deterred from taking further action after they 
received no response or an automated reply with no 
follow-up (Stray, 2017).3 Thus, even though major 
companies like Microsoft are encouraging young people 
to report ‘cruel, abusive and inappropriate content and 
conduct’ (Microsoft, 2017), it is necessary to ensure that 
there are accountability mechanisms built into this drive. 
If Australians expect content reporting to be ‘easy’, 
government and relevant civil society organisations need 
to explore the roles they might play in making sure social 
media complaints processes are simple to negotiate, 
have clear, commensurate outcomes and are reported 
transparently. Similarly, there must be open avenues 
for appeal against platform sanctions for posting 
inappropriate content, such as account suspension.
In this study then we have identified a perceptual gap 
between what ordinary Australians think is the digital 
policy environment (it’s easy to get content removed 
from online publications and platforms) and what 
is evident from public accounts of content removal 
struggles internationally (it is not easy, and takes time 
and negotiation). There is also a normative gap between 
what people think should be happening (social media 
platforms should monitor and proactively remove 
content) and what social media companies think are the 
limits of their responsibilities.
In legal and trade dealings with governments 
internationally, the major social media companies have 
maintained that they are technology businesses, which 
simply host services that enable their users to publish 
and network with each other (Napoli & Caplan, 2017). 
Our research indicates that Australians expect them to 
behave more like media companies, exerting control 
over the standard of content they host and working 
with government and users on improving the safety and 
civility of their communicative domains. The way in which 
we choose to move forward in law, policy and regulation 
of online speech, however, might better tend towards 
co-regulatory agreements than direct legal interventions, 
as the following case study suggests.
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6.6 Hate speech: co-regulation for 
rights protection and education
The degree of responsibility that social media platforms 
should have for content moderation is a subject of 
intense debate, particularly in Europe. There, two 
contrasting regulatory moves are testing the possibilities 
for controlling hate speech against refugees in the 
wake of the 2015–16 immigration crisis. The first is 
a voluntary, cooperative agreement between the 
European Commission (EC) and the major social 
media platforms designed to reduce the incidence of 
hate speech through better complaints reporting and 
standards education. The other move is national legal 
intervention, with a new anti-hate speech law introduced 
in Germany, which will bind platforms to time-sensitive 
content takedowns.
The problem of online hate speech came to a head 
in Europe after an upswing in xenophobic, politically 
extremist and violent, racially discriminatory posts on 
social media channels, following the 2015–16 waves 
of refugees and economic migrants into southern 
Europe from Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, North Africa 
and the Balkans. At the EC’s first Annual Colloquium 
on Fundamental Rights, it observed that that ‘[h]ate 
speech, which incites to violence and hatred, particularly 
online, was identified as increasingly worrying, and 
now constituting the main source of hate incidents’ 
(European Commission, 2015).4 Participants noted 
the need to cooperate with social media platforms 
to combat hate speech, and to better record, act on 
and prosecute hate crimes. As an outcome, the EC 
committed to dialogue with ‘IT companies’, as well as 
businesses, national authorities and civil society on ways 
to tackle hate speech, including ‘by making it easier for 
users to report illegal content to companies’ (European 
Commission, 2015).
In March 2016, the European Commission announced 
its Code of Conduct On Countering Illegal Hate 
Speech Online, creating a non-binding framework 
for cooperation between the EC, EU Member States, 
civil society organisations (CSOs) and the four largest 
transnational technology companies to reduce and 
counter illegal hate speech narratives. As the code 
notes, the aim is to stop the proliferation of speech that 
‘not only negatively affects the groups or individuals that 
it targets, [but] … also negatively impacts those who 
speak out for freedom, tolerance and non-discrimination 
in our open societies and has a chilling effect on the 
democratic discourse on online platforms’ (European 
Union, 2016b).
Aside from requiring the platforms to review and take 
down the majority of illegal speech within 24 hours, 
the Code also requires the platforms to work with 
CSOs and trusted reporters on clarifying reporting 
procedures and expediting expert notifications, as well 
as developing strategies to promote counter narratives. 
Finally, it encourages those companies to cooperate 
with other non-signatory social media services in sharing 
information about, and developing best practices in, the 
detection, reporting, review and removal of hate speech.
Progress on the agreement was not rapid. The first report 
in December 2016 showed that only 28% of notifications 
resulted in take-downs, and only 40% of notifications 
were processed within 24 hours, while another 43% took 
48 hours (European Commission, 2016c). However, a 
second review in June 2017 suggested that companies 
had more than doubled their incidence of content 
removal to 59% and increased their review capacity. Two 
concerns were raised about platform responsiveness, 
however, with companies being less likely to remove 
content flagged by citizens rather than trusted reporters, 
and differing significantly in the quality of feedback 
they gave on moderation decision-making (European 
Commission, 2016b). EU Commissioner for Justice, 
Consumers and Equality Vĕra Jourová said that while the 
achievements were ‘encouraging’, she wanted to see 
‘the IT companies provide better feedback to those who 
notified cases’ and make ‘further progress to deliver on 
all the commitments’ (European Commission, 2016d).
In contrast to this cooperative arrangement, Germany 
has just legislated, under its Network Enforcement Act 
2017, or NetZDG, to force social media companies to 
take down illegal speech within 24 hours or face up to 
€50 million in fines.5 The German approach, which has 
been championed by Justice Minister Heiko Maas, is 
consistent with the nation’s hard line, following World 
War II, on constraining hate speech or Volksverhetzung 
– incitement of people. This concept is defined in 
paragraph 130 of the German Criminal Code as 
an act that:
•	 incites hatred against segments of the population or 
calls for violent or  arbitrary measures against them, or
•	 assaults the human dignity of others by insulting, 
maliciously maligning, or  defaming segments of the 
population.
The NetzDG, which came into force in October 2017, 
is wider in scope than the EC scheme in application 
and penalties. It applies to all profit-making internet 
platforms that enable users to share content with others 
or make it publicly available, and so could include 
gaming communities as well as social media. It requires 
services to ‘remove or block obviously unlawful content 
within 24 hours of receipt of a complaint’, while a 
second category of ‘controversial content’, which may 
or may not be illegal in Germany, must be reviewed 
and evaluated for removal within seven days. As critics 
have noted, the time limit may lead to over-enforcement 
to avoid penalties. It also puts US companies with 
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First Amendment-modelled community standards into 
potential conflict with administering German defamation 
and criminal insult laws (Lee 2017).
Both the German law and the European Code are 
distinct attempts by governments to shape the 
development of transnational and cross cultural speech 
standards that would otherwise be set by US-based 
private enterprise. The problem is that these measures 
contribute to the jurisdictional peculiarities that are 
creating a ‘splinternet’ of regulatory conditions for 
online communication.
The benefits of the EC approach are that it:
•	 mandates better definition and awareness of best 
practice reporting practices and complaints processing
•	 supports community and corporate education on 
illegal speech forms and impacts, and
•	 encourages cooperative strategies for reducing 
harmful behaviour and promoting counter-narratives to 
extremist speech.
Importantly, it potentially spreads the responsibility 
for reporting hateful and offensive speech from the 
individual to a network of expert reporting organisations, 
and introduces accountability measures to evaluate 
the success of the scheme – which may become self-
regulatory in the future. For these reasons, this type of 
institutional support for individual speech rights and 
responsibilities appears a more equitable and flexible 
means of regulating for communicative change than 
relying on national legislation alone.
Endnotes
1  Highly publicised instances of cyberbullying have 
included that of television host Charlotte Dawson, 
prior to her suicide, and the trolling of former 
Primer Minister Julia Gillard (Morrissey & Yell, 2016). 
The latter case led Gillard to negotiate the 2013 
‘Cooperative Arrangement for Complaints Handling 
on Social Networking Sites’ with Facebook, Google/
YouTube, Yahoo! And Microsoft (DBCDE, 2013).
2  Coalition MPs, for example, led the 2017 
parliamentary move to reform section 18C of the 
Racial Discrimination Act 1975, which makes it illegal 
to offend, insult, humiliate or intimidate someone 
because of their race, colour, or national or ethnic 
origin.
3  In November 2017, the United Kingdom instituted 
new Crown Prosecution Service guidance for the 
handling of online hate speech cases by prosecutors 
and police, to try and improve prosecution rates.
4  This refers to hate speech as defined by the EC 
Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA of 28 November 
2008.
5  Germany’s Gesetz zur Verbesserung der 
Rechtsdurchsetzung in sozialen Netzwerken 
[Act to Improve the Enforcement of Rights on 
Social Networks] 2017 is popularly known as 
the Netzwerksdurchsetzungsgesetz (Network 
Enforcement Act) or NetzDG.
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Appendix
Digital Rights Survey: 
Essential Media Script 
and Questionnaire
Introduction
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this survey. 
We want to talk to you today about rights and 
responsibilities in using the internet and social media. 
We’d like to get opinions about information privacy, 
work, and how people talk online. There are no right or 
wrong answers, we are interested in how you think about 
these questions. 
The survey is for research purposes only, and we would 
like to remind you that your answers are anonymous and 
confidential. Your responses will not be attributed to you 
directly.
This survey will take around 15 minutes to complete.
Section 1: Background  
[ask both waves]
QA: Which of these best describes what you were 
doing for most of last week: 
a. In full-time paid work (or away temporarily, e.g. on 
holidays or sick leave)
b. In part-time/casual paid work (or away temporarily, e.g. 
on holidays or sick leave)
c. Looking after your own children / the home
d. Retired
e. Otherwise not in paid work
[Ask QB if QA = A or B]
QB: If working: Which of the following best describes 
your current occupation? 
a. (Professional/Managerial
b. Sales/Clerical
c. Technical/Skilled
d. Manual work/Labourer
e. Other (please specify).
QC: Are you the parent or guardian of any children 
under age 18 now living in your household?
•	 Yes 
•	 No
Q1: Which of the following devices do you use to 
connect to the internet? [Multiple response]
a. Desktop or laptop computer
b. Mobile phone
c. Tablet 
d. E-reader
e. Web browser connected to your TV (e.g. through a 
Kodi box)
Q2: Please rank the following from the devices you 
use most often to connect to the internet to the 
devices you use least [for all devices used at Q1]
a. Desktop or laptop computer
b. Mobile phone
c. Tablet 
d. E-reader
e. Web browser connected to your TV  
(e.g. through a Kodi box)
[Ask if use ‘mobile phone’ at Q1]
Q3: Excluding those that came preinstalled, how 
many additional apps do you have installed on your 
mobile phone?
a. Less than 5
b. 5-10
c. 11-20
d. More than 20 
58
Q4: Which of the following social media services do 
you use:
[Multiple response A-F, if G chosen must be only option]
a. Facebook
b. Twitter
c. Instagram
d. Snapchat
e. WeChat
f. Weibo
g. None of the above
[Ask Q5 if more than one option chosen at Q4]
Q5: Which of those do you use most often?
[List only options chosen at Q4]
a. Facebook
b. Twitter
c. Instagram
d. Snapchat
e. WeChat
f. Weibo
[Ask for the option selected in Q5]
Q6. For [social media platform], please specify how 
often you do each of the following?1
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A Post a comment 
or image 
B Like or favourite 
other people’s 
posts, photos, or 
links 
C Comment on 
other people’s 
posts, photos, or 
links 
D Share or retweet 
other people’s 
posts, photos, or 
links 
E Send private 
messages 
Q7. What do you think are the most important 
political, social or legal issues with the internet and 
digital technologies that need to be addressed in the 
next five years or so? [Open-ended]
Q8. What steps if any do you think social media 
companies should take to ensure their platforms are 
safe, civil spaces for public discussion?
Section 2: Information/Privacy  
[ask both waves]
Q9: Please indicate how strongly you agree or 
disagree with the following statements2:
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A I want to know 
what social media 
companies do with 
the information they 
collect, share, keep 
and use about me
B Media companies are 
entitled to republish 
material they find on 
people’s social media 
accounts as it has 
already been publicly 
shared with others
C The internet needs 
to be regulated in 
terms of what can be 
shown and written 
online
D [If use any social 
media service at 
Q4] I have a good 
understanding of 
how to adjust my 
privacy settings on 
social media sites 
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Q10: Do you believe the following are breaches of 
your privacy?:
D
efi
ni
te
ly
 a
 b
re
ac
h 
of
 
m
y 
pr
iv
ac
y
So
rt
 o
f a
 b
re
ac
h 
of
 
m
y 
pr
iv
ac
y
N
ot
 re
al
ly
 a
 b
re
ac
h 
of
 
m
y 
pr
iv
ac
y
D
efi
ni
te
ly
 n
ot
 a
 
br
ea
ch
 o
f m
y 
pr
iv
ac
y
U
ns
ur
e
A If the government 
requires my phone 
company to keep 
information about 
who I call and when
B If a prospective 
employer looks at 
my public social 
media profile
C If someone in my 
social network 
publishes online a 
photo of me without 
my permission
Q11: How strongly do you agree or disagree with the 
following?3 
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A I actively protect 
my privacy online
B I have nothing to 
hide
C I feel I can control 
my privacy online
E There is no privacy 
– get over it
F Concerns about 
privacy online are 
exaggerated
G I am concerned 
corporations 
are violating my 
privacy online
H I am concerned 
governments 
are violating my 
privacy online
I I am concerned 
other people 
are violating my 
privacy online
Q12: If you could access reports on the internet user 
profiles constructed about you, how important would 
it be for you to know about the following:
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A Records of what you 
have bought online
B Records of what you 
have done on social 
media
C The list of third party 
companies that can 
access your profile
D What third party 
companies do 
with your personal 
information
E How to report or 
correct inaccurate 
information
Q13: Have you ever had your privacy violated online? 
How did it affect you? Choose all that apply4
[Multiple response apart from A] 
a. No
b. Yes and it affected my personal relationships
c. Yes and affected my job / career
d. Yes and it had financial consequences
e. Yes and it was embarrassing
f. Yes and it was a minor problem
Q14: Have you ever used any of the following?
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A A virtual private 
network (VPN)
B Encrypted 
messaging or 
encrypted email
C An internet privacy 
tool such as TOR
[Ask if use any social media services at Q4]
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Q15:  Thinking specifically about the social media 
platform you use most often, have you changed the 
privacy settings from the original default setting to 
restrict who can access your profile? 5 
a. Yes
b. No
c. Unsure
Q16:  In making decisions about what information to 
share with companies online, at any point in the last 
month have you felt any of the following? (tick box 
for those that apply)6
[Multiple response]
a. Discouraged by the amount of effort needed to 
understand what would be done with your data 
b. Confused by the information provided in a privacy 
policy 
c. Confident that you understood what would be done 
with your data 
d. Impatient because you wanted to learn more but 
needed to make a decision right away 
Q17: Should the government be able to prevent 
media organisations from publishing information 
about the following? 7
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A Large political 
protests in our 
country
B Economic issues 
that might 
destabilise 
the country’s 
economy
C Sensitive issues 
related to national 
security and 
foreign relations
Q18: Do you FAVOUR or OPPOSE the following8 
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A A government 
program to collect 
communications of 
nearly all internet 
users as part of anti-
terrorism efforts
B The government 
requiring internet 
service providers to 
store information 
about who you 
contact, when, and 
what websites you visit
C Law enforcement 
and security agencies 
being able to access 
information about who 
you contact, when, 
and what websites 
you visit 
D A government 
program that tracks 
your use of public 
services and benefits
Section 3: Work  
[ask wave 1 only]
Q19: On a typical day, how much would you say you 
use the internet to do work-related tasks? 9 
a. Frequently
b. Sometimes
c. Hardly ever
d. Never
Q20: Which of the following does your workplace 
have?10
[Multiple response]
a. Policies or rules about how you present yourself on 
the internet, for example, what you can post on blogs 
and websites, or what information you can share about 
yourself online 
b. Policies or rules about using social media while at work
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Q21. How strongly do you agree or disagree with 
each of the following11
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A Social media 
distracts me from 
the work I need 
to do
B Social media lets 
me see too much 
information about 
my co-workers
C Social media is 
important for 
helping me do my 
work or job
E It is acceptable 
for prospective 
employers to look 
at your public 
social media posts
F It is acceptable 
for prospective 
employers to look 
at your private 
social media posts
G It is acceptable for 
current employers 
to look at your 
public social media 
posts
H It is acceptable for 
current employers 
to look at your 
private social 
media posts
Q22: Do you ever do any of the following things?12
Yes I have 
done this
Heard of 
it but not 
done it
Never 
heard of 
this before
A Hire someone online 
to do a task or 
household errand, 
using a service like 
Airtasker
B Use driver services 
such as Uber
C Order food or alcohol 
home delivery using 
an online app such as 
Foodora or Deliveroo 
Q23: In recent years, technology has allowed 
individual workers to perform one-off tasks for 
people who need those services. Some people refer 
to this as “gig work”. These workers typically do not 
follow a set schedule, and get paid as they pick up 
assignments instead of receiving an hourly wage or 
salary. Based on what you know, do you think these 
jobs…13
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A Are a good entry 
level job for people 
who are entering 
the workforce
B Leave workers 
financially insecure
C Are great for 
people who want a 
flexible schedule
E Are the kind of jobs 
you can build a 
career out of
F Are a good option 
for older people 
who don’t want to 
work fulltime any 
more
Q24: Which ONE of the following statements about 
government regulation of any of these online gig 
work platforms do you agree with most?
[Single response]
a. these platforms should be fully regulated to give gig 
workers the same kind of rights that other employees 
have 
b. new employment-related regulations should be 
created specifically for these platforms
c. the relationship between these platforms and gig 
workers does not need to be regulated
d. not sure
Q25: How much have you heard about the debate 
happening in some cities over whether services like 
Uber should be regulated in the same way as existing 
taxi companies?
a. A lot
b. A little
c. Nothing at all
[Ask if QA = A or B (in paid work)]
62
Q26: How concerned are you about the following: 14 
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A Losing your job 
because your 
employer finds 
someone who is 
willing to do your 
job for less money
B Losing your job 
because you aren’t 
able to keep up 
with the technical 
skills required to 
do it
C Losing your 
job because 
your employer 
uses machines 
or computer 
programs to 
replace human 
workers
D Losing your job 
or missing a 
job opportunity 
because of 
material posted 
by, or about, you 
on social media
Section 4: Free speech  
[ask wave 2 only]
Q27: How strongly do you agree or disagree with the 
following statements15
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A I should be free to 
say and do what I 
want online
B Everyone should 
be free to say and 
do what they want 
online
C Everyone should 
have the right to 
anonymity online
Q28: How strongly do you agree or disagree that 
people should be able to make the following types of 
statements online16
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A Criticisms of 
government 
policies
B Criticisms 
of religious 
organisations or 
religious beliefs 
C Criticisms of 
minority groups
D Sexually explicit 
statements
E Calls for violent 
protests
F Encouraging non-
violent actions 
that break laws the 
person believes 
are wrong 
Q29: How important is it that social media platforms 
remove the following types of information as soon as 
possible (e.g. within 24 hours)?
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A Abuse targeted at an 
individual
B Sexual harassment
C Sexually explicit talk
D Hate speech that 
encourages violence
E Anti-government talk
F Extremist political 
talk
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Q30: Most social media companies and some 
governments demand people always use their 
real names when posting online. In the following 
situations, if you could use remain anonymous would 
you be likely to:
More 
likely
Less 
likely
No 
difference
Unsure
A Post honest and open 
views on the news
B Talk about sensitive 
topics like sexuality
C Pretend to hold views 
that you don’t for 
amusement
D Question others’ 
opinions
E Get into an argument 
with someone
Q31: Which of the following have affected your online 
interactions?
[Multiple response]
a. Mean or abusive remarks 
b. Trolling, harassment or bullying (sustained abuse)
c. Unwanted sexual contact (sexts, solicitation)
d. Violent sexual contact (revenge porn, sexualised 
threats)
e. Racism
f. Personal information exposed deliberately or 
maliciously (doxing) 
g. Personal information posted without permission by 
others (eg. childrens’ photos)
h. Impersonation or swatting (hoax calls made in your 
name) 
Q32: Many websites and apps have a function to 
report things you find inappropriate or offensive. 
Which of the following apply to you:
a. I’m aware of this function and have used it in the last 
12 months
b. I’m aware of this function but haven’t used it in the last 
12 months
c. I’m not aware of this function
[Ask if Q32 = a]
Q33: When you reported something, how satisfied 
were you with the response? If you’ve reported 
something more than once, please think of the most 
recent time you did it.
a. Very satisfied
b. Fairly satisfied
c. Fairly dissatisfied
d. Very dissatisfied
[Ask if use social media at Q4]
Q34: Has anything you’ve posted on social media 
ever been removed, censored or restricted? 
a. Yes
b. No
c. Unsure
[Ask if Q34 = yes]
Q35:  How clear are you about why the content was 
removed, censored or restricted? 
a. Very clear
b. Fairly clear
c. Not particularly clear
d. Not at all clear
[Ask if Q34 = yes]
Q36: Have you ever tried to appeal or complain about 
a decision to remove your content?
a. Yes
b. No
c. Unsure
[Ask if Q36 = yes]
Q37: Were you satisfied with the response to your 
complaint?
a. Yes
b. No
c. Unsure
Q38: Which of the following have you ever done: 
Done this 
more than 
once
Done 
this 
once
Not 
done 
this
A Reduced your own comments 
on social media due to other 
people’s behaviour
B [if QC = Yes] Advised your 
child to reduce their social 
media use due to other 
people’s behaviour
C Deleted one of your social 
media accounts due to abuse 
or bullying 
D [if QC = Yes] Advised your 
child to delete an account due 
to abuse or bullying
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Section 5: Demographics  
[ask both waves]
a. Regardless of which party you intend to vote for or 
how you currently feel about the parties and their 
leaders, to which party do you generally feel closest?: 
b. [Labor, Liberal, National, Greens, One Nation, 
Independent or Other Party, Don’t Know, None of 
them]
c. Age groups (18-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, 60-69, 70+)
d. Gender [M, F, other] 
e. Location: [a capital city, a regional city, a small town, or 
a rural area.] 
f. What is the highest level of education you have 
completed? [Did not complete high school, 
Completed high school, Skilled/vocational TAFE 
qualification, Bachelor degree or associate diploma, 
Masters or Higher post graduate qualification]
g. Do you speak a language other than English at home? 
If yes, which one: [Italian, Greek, Arabic, Cantonese/
Mandarin, Vietnamese, other (specify)] 
h. Do you receive a disability pension or the disability 
support pension? (yes, no)
Thank you for taking our survey. 
We will be running some online discussion groups in 
the next month or so. Would you mind if we perhaps re-
contacted you later, to see if you’re interested? You’d be 
under no obligation – you could decide at the time. You 
would receive $100 to thank you, if you participate in 
the group. (Please note: We never send advertising or try 
to sell anything. We only conduct genuine research.)
Yes, you may re-contact me about the 
online discussion group
1 CONTINUE
No, do not re-contact me 0
FINISH 
SURVEY
If yes: Great! Please provide some contact details so we 
can get in touch with you:
Full name
Email address
(Confirm email address)
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Australians are some of the world’s greatest users of social media 
and mobile broadband, and the nation is in the top ten globally for 
internet use. At a time when use of these technologies is increasingly 
redefining aspects of personal and professional lives, Digital Rights 
in Australia explores urgent questions about the nature of our rights 
now and into the future. The analysis covers rights issues in four 
areas: privacy, profiling and analytics; government data-matching 
and surveillance; workplace change; and freedom of expression and 
speech regulation. It explores the ethical and legal challenges we 
face in using digital, networked technologies and the debates we 
are having about how to best manage their transformative impacts. 
Crucially this study examines the major role of private, transnational 
digital platforms in reshaping the way we work, study and conduct 
business, our interactions with government and with each other.
